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A number of issues combine to make network protocol development signif-
icantly more difficult than other areas of computer programming: problems
with time, concurrency, and failures; interactions between the network proto-
col and its environment; and obstacles in developing the protocol over time.
In order to address these issues, we introduce the Timed Abstract Pro-
tocol notation and the Austin Protocol Compiler. The Timed Abstract Pro-
tocol, or TAP, notation is a domain-specific formal language for describing
asynchronous message-passing network protocols, with two execution models:
an abstract execution model and a concrete execution model. The abstract
execution model is suited for protocol design, comprehension, and correctness
verification. The concrete execution model is suited for protocol implementa-
tion. We show that the two models are equivalent: that a protocol interpreted
under the concrete model preserves the intended behavior of the protocol in-
terpreted under the abstract model. The Austin Protocol Compiler, or APC,
is a system that transforms a protocol given in the Timed Abstract Protocol
vii
notation into executable C code and provides a runtime environment for the
protocol. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the TAP notation and
APC, we present implementations of a secure encryption key exchange proto-
col, a failure discovery protocol, and a Domain Name System server. While
discussing the latter, we examine the performance of the APC implementation
and show that it is comparable to two other DNS servers.
The combination of the Timed Abstract Protocol notation and the
Austin Protocol Compiler addresses the issues of network protocol develop-
ment by allowing precise and verifiable descriptions of protocols which can be
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A network protocol is the set of rules necessary to allow two or more compu-
tational processes to communicate with each other. These processes may be
executing on the same machine or on different machines connected by many
different kinds of networks. The processes may be separate operating system
processes, running different programs; or may be virtual processes, modular
parts of a single program; or may be components of the operating system.
The key factors are that there are more than one process and that they must
communicate with each other.
As computational processes, they communicate by exchanging well-
defined messages across a communication channel, and the nature of this ex-
change defines the rules making up a network protocol. The most conspicuous
aspect of these rules is the format of the messages which the processes ex-
change. More importantly, however, the rules describe the computation that
each of the processes must make in order to send the correct message contain-
ing the correct values at the correct time.
The rules making up the network protocol, both the message formats
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and the computations, are embodied by programs, and the development of
both the abstract rules and the concrete programs is the subject of this re-
search.
1.1 Protocol development problems
Network protocol development presents a number of problems beyond those
of developing traditional serial programs. Many of these problems are shared
with other parallel and distributed programming tasks, but many more are




Intrinsic problems. In general, the intrinsic problems in network protocol
development include the same classes of safety and liveness problems associ-
ated with any distributed or parallel program. In any communicating system,
whether it is a parallel or distributed program or a network protocol, the or-
dering of events is not well determined: many events may happen at once and
a given sequence of events may not be repeatable. The number of potential
orderings seriously hinders development, which is often based on intuitions
gained from serial programs.
Beyond those classes of problems, intrinsic problems in network protocol
development should also include two two further areas: communication errors
and security problems.
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Communication errors such as message loss or message corruption are
not normally seen in general distributed or parallel programming. Although
a distributed program may be running in an environment subject to such
errors, it is usually built on a network protocol that hides the errors. However,
these errors are very common in the environment of message-passing network
protocols; common enough to need to be a basic feature of the conceptual
model for network protocols.
Security problems should be considered an intrinsic problem of network
protocols, although they are often not. Some aspects of security in a net-
work protocol are confidentiality; integrity; authorization; authentication and
its converse, anonymity; and non-repudiation and its converse, plausible de-
niability. All of these aspects should be treated as intrinsic problems for a
protocol since the number of possible attacks on each aspect make it impos-
sible to foresee all of them—conceptually, correcting vulnerabilities is easier
than defending against attacks.
Intrinsic problems of a network protocol apply, and can be described, in
isolation, without reference to any systems outside the processes and channels
involved in the protocol. For that same reason, they can also be handled in
isolation. Common, successful techniques for handling intrinsic problems use
formal methods such as correctness verification and model checking.
Extrinsic problems. While many of the intrinsic problems of network pro-
tocol development are shared with the development of any distributed or par-
allel program, other issues are unique to network protocols.
The environment of the network protocol introduces the extrinsic prob-
lems of network protocol development. There are interactions between some
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extrinsic problems and the intrinsic problems described previously. For ex-
ample, while communication errors themselves are best considered intrinsic
faults, many characteristics of their occurrence are not. Consider a protocol
which sends a large number of small messages back-to-back, with no delay be-
tween messages, across a network containing a router which, when congested,
drops the most recently received messages. The protocol may be expecting
uncorrelated message loss errors, allowing at least some messages through the
network, but in this case message losses are not uncorrelated—the router will
tend to drop the entire burst. In this case, the behavior of the protocol may
be intrinsically correct, but unsatisfactory in use.
On the other hand, extrinsic problems also include non-error issues
such as the effects of the protocol on other instances of the protocol or other
protocols sharing the same network. These issues are significantly different
from intrinsic problems. A protocol’s correct behavior may cause congestion
collapse in a network shared by many instances of the protocol, or may starve
other protocols of network resources that must be shared. In general, such
behavior cannot be seen by examining the protocol in isolation; it often only
becomes visible with experience running a new protocol.
One set of examples of extrinsic problems in protocol development lies in
the original HyperText Transport Protocol, both versions 0.9 and (according
to the default behavior) 1.0[8]. The fundamental idea behind HTTP was
originally quite simple—the client opens a Transmission Control Protocol, or
TCP, connection with the server, makes a request, and reads the response.
The closing of the connection by the server indicates the end of the response;
from the client’s viewpoint, the connection resembles a normal file I/O stream.
Two problems with this simple approach are:
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1. Opening a TCP connection requires a three-message handshake and clos-
ing the connection may require four messages[68, 69].1 Since the request
and response are normally fairly small, the connection management mes-
sages represented a significant part of the traffic involved in the request.
Since much of the cost of the work in the network is effectively per-
message, this inefficiency primarily impacted the network itself.
2. Between the round trips of the connection establishment and TCP’s
congestion avoiding slow-start behavior, the connection-per-request ap-
proach resulted in significant latency[66, 69]. One response to this la-
tency was to use multiple connections to the same server to make several
related requests simultaneously. Since congestion-control information
was not shared between connections, this response makes the overall set
of requests (for the resources associated with a single web page, for exam-
ple) behave in a more aggressive fashion in terms of congestion control,
again impacting the network[5].
The newer version of HTTP, 1.1[27], attempts to solve those two problems
by keeping connections alive for multiple requests and by multiplexing several
requests simultaneously on the same connection. As a result, HTTP 1.1 is no
longer simple.
Compatibility problems. The final class of problems in network proto-
col development does not directly concern the protocol itself, but rather the
network protocol development process, including interoperability, extensions,
1It is possible to piggy-back the connection closing flags on data messages, but many
traces of TCP connections do not show such behavior.
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and enhancements. Generally, all of the components of a distributed or par-
allel program are developed together, as part of the same effort. Different
protocol components, such as different processes communicating by using a
protocol or different implementations of the same process in a given proto-
col, are not—a process on one machine may communicate with a process on
a completely different type of machine elsewhere, with both processes being
developed independently in space and time. If protocol development does not
center around a coherent specification of the protocol, interoperability between
the components suffers.
A related problem involves changes in the protocol itself. After using
a network protocol for a period of time, additional features may need to be
added to the protocol or existing behavior of the protocol may need to be
changed. Since parts of the protocol are implemented separately, the altered
protocol should be capable of continuing to interoperate with the previous
version. While the details of such changes are not foreseeable, if the original
development of the protocol does not include the possibility, the protocol may
later need to be scrapped entirely or its existence and inflexibility may hinder
future progress.
1.2 Existing solutions
There are many successful methods of handling each of these problems, al-
though not all methods cover all of the problems successfully.
The most visibly successful method is used by the Internet Engineering
Task Force and the Internet community. This method is based on natural-
language protocol standards documents, the Internet Drafts and the Request
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For Comments series, along with interoperating implementations. The process
for Internet standards, including protocols, is described in RFC2026[17]. The
goals of the process, from RFC2026, are:
In general, an Internet Standard is a specification that is stable
and well-understood, is technically competent, has multiple, inde-
pendent, and interoperable implementations with substantial op-
erational experience, enjoys significant public support, and is rec-
ognizably useful in some or all parts of the Internet.
Unfortunately, standards documents are frequently large and imprecise.
Often the only formal specifications of a protocol are the implementations,
which are often not identified in the standards, are frequently not available
for inspection, and are themselves far from concise or understandable. For
instance, Wright and Stevens in Volume 2 of TCP/IP Illustrated [73] present
much of the code from the BSD4.4 TCP/IP suite implementation, and it is a
rather large volume. Additionally, as can be seen from TCP/IP Illustrated, the
implementation often hides the important details of a protocol in a larger mass
of code; important details handling intrinsic or extrinsic issues frequently com-
prise only a small fraction of the implementation, while these details require
a great deal of research and constitute the largest part of the difficulties in
protocol development. For example, Nagle’s algorithm[55], which adaptively
inhibits small messages in TCP connections and thus helps avoid network con-
gestion collapse, requires approximately four lines of code in TCP/IP Illus-
trated ’s presentation. Refinements to Nagle’s algorithm, originally published
in 1984, are still being suggested; for example, by Minshall, et al., in 1999[51].
The key to understanding and implementing any complex system with
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vital but minuscule details, particularly in such an ad-hoc environment, is
modularization. In the case of network protocols, modularization almost al-
ways involves layering.
1.3 Protocol layering
Modularization proceeds by identifying some aspect of a system and encapsu-
lating that aspect as a component behind some interface which allows other
components to manipulate it while hiding the details of the component. In
network protocols, each component is a layer, conceptually built using the
services provided by a lower layer and in turn providing services to a higher
layer.
Figure 1.3 shows the most common illustration of such layering, the In-
ternational Standards Organization’s (ISO) Open Systems Interconnect (OSI)
reference model[56]. In this model, each layer communicates with the layers
above and below it, and conceptually, with the corresponding layer in some
other process. In practice, this model provides notation and descriptive terms;
it is not commonly used for implementations.
Figure 1.2 shows a similar model used by the Internet protocols. It has
been referred to as the hourglass model, since the Internet Protocol acts as a
common unifying layer. In contrast with the OSI model, this model is the basis
for the implementation of the Internet, not only from the standpoint of the
operating system’s code, but also in the layout of the messages exchanged—as
each message is sent, each descending layer prepends any information it uses
to the message as a header and as each message is received, each ascending







2. Data link layer
1. Physical layer
Transmission Reception
Figure 1.1: The OSI Reference Model. Messages being sent logi-
cally descend through the layers; messages being received ascend.
Application layer (SMTP, NNTP, HTTP, etc.)
Transport layer (TCP, UDP, SCTP, RTP, etc.)
Internet layer (IP)
Network layer (Ethernet, ATM, etc.)
Figure 1.2: The Internet model (the hourglass).
For support in developing layered protocols, one framework, the x-
Kernel[38, 57], stands out. The x-Kernel provides an efficient scaffolding for
assembling a number of network protocol layers, where each layer is imple-
mented independently using the library provided by the x-Kernel.
Unfortunately, layering introduces a new sin: the layering violation.
Like the crime of heresy, a layering violation may only be visible within its own
model. Specifically, a layering violation occurs when a layer n inappropriately
uses an interface of a layer greater than n + 1 or less than n− 1.
While such violations often indicate a failure in the modularity of the
design, in many cases layering becomes a goal itself2, resulting in contorted
protocol designs. For example, one feature of TCP that has caused layering
2In fact, Peterson and Davie[57] define protocol in terms of the layers.
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violation arguments is Path MTU discovery[54]. The maximum transmission
unit (MTU) of a network link is the maximum size message that can be sent
over the link. The Path MTU (PMTU) is the smallest of the MTUs in the
network between two processes. If a process sends a message that is larger than
the MTU for a link, IP will fragment the message into parts small enough to
pass through the link. These fragments are not reassembled until all reach
the destination process and the loss of a single fragment results in the loss
of the whole message. Fragmenting and reassembling messages also requires
processing time from network components which may not have it to spare—
routers, in the first case, and the critical path for incoming messages, in the
second. For these and other reasons, protocols such as TCP would prefer not
to have their messages fragmented. On the other hand, these protocols would
also prefer to use the largest message possible, since that reduces the overhead
needed for the communication.
The potential layering violation revolves around the fact that MTU sizes
are attributes of network layers below IP, while the protocols attempting to
identify the best message size are above IP and IP does not provide them with
path MTU information. Path MTU discovery uses the “don’t fragment” flag
in IP messages, which causes an IP router to drop any message that is too large
and respond with an ICMP “can’t fragment” error message. TCP (or another
higher-layer protocol) can receive this error and then adjust its transmissions
to find the largest workable message size. Whether this is a layering violation
or not, RFC1191, describing path MTU discovery, is a Draft Standard on the
Internet Architecture Board Standards Track.
There are similar arguments around explicit congestion notification[60]
and many other useful techniques. The proliferation of these and other
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techniques leads to the IETF being described as a “architectural pretzel
factory”[14]. In response, Braden, Farber, and Handley[16] propose a “role-
based architecture” as an non-layered alternative; whether it will be successful
as such is an open question.
The problems with HTTP described previously also demonstrate the
difficulties with a layered architecture—these problems show a conflict between
the behavior of HTTP and the intended use of TCP. Unfortunately, since the
development of congestion-controlled transport protocols such as TCP and
the deployment of such protocols are both difficult, adding another transport
protocol with semantics better matched to HTTP’s behavior did not occur.
1.4 Protocol frameworks
In Figure 1.2, the distance in terms of behavior between what the proto-
cols of the transport layer provide and what the protocols of the application
layer need is broad. Since many similar application protocols make individ-
ual choices from a relatively limited set of behaviors, protocol frameworks can
be designed to bridge this distance, in effect supplying intermediary layers
specifically designed for a class of applications.
Birman, et al.[11, 32], have developed several such frameworks (such as
Horus and Ensemble) based on micro-protocols and layering, where protocol
components implementing various behaviors can be assembled (somewhat like
Lego blocks) to create a system combining the behaviors. Unfortunately, the
protocol composition style does not necessarily take into account inter-micro-
protocol behavioral relationships which do not allow arbitrary composition.3
3Specifically, in one presentation, two blocks labelled “compression” and “encryption”
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Another framework is the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol,
BEEP[63, 61]. The BEEP framework is designed to handle asynchronous,
message-passing, connection-oriented application protocols, and to provide for
the following aspects of application behavior[62]:
• framing, which tells how the beginning and ending of each message is
delimited;
• encoding, which tells how a message is represented when exchanged;
• reporting, which tells how errors are described;
• asynchrony, which tells how independent exchanges are handled;
• authentication, which tells how the peers at each end of the connection
are identified and verified; and,
• privacy, which tells how the exchanges are protected against third-party
interception or modification.
These aspects are described by “profiles” which define the syntax and seman-
tics of the messages exchanged. BEEP offers a great deal of flexibility for
handling much of the complexity in designing application protocols. Unfortu-
nately, the framework needed to provide the flexibility is quite complicated:
For example, Rose[61] says, “Messages are arbitrary MIME [Multipurpose In-
ternet Mail Extensions] content, but are usually textual (structured using XML
[the eXtensible Markup Language])”.
were shown composed both ways; unfortunately, these two components cannot be arbitrarily
composed because encryption results in incompressible data.
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Although these frameworks are quite successful in their intended envi-
ronment, their size and complexity limit their applicability in environments
with restricted space or computational power, in addition to the limits im-
posed by their area of focus. Also, they are built with, and intended to be
used with, code written in a traditional programming language. As described
previously, most programming languages obscure the network protocol-specific
issues and problems.
Finally, while frameworks provide flexibility, this flexibility is only avail-
able in the domain of the framework—using a framework outside its design
domain is likely to be an uphill battle.
1.5 Protocol languages
Frameworks, such as those described previously, serve primarily as runtime
support for code written in a traditional programming language. Like the ad
hoc techniques described earlier, they have two limitations:
• Traditional programming languages do not highlight network protocol-
specific behavior, and impede understanding the protocol’s intrinsic, ex-
trinsic, and compatibility issues.
• Their size and complexity appear at runtime. (Although some frame-
works such as Ensemble minimize their runtime footprint by performing
optimizations at compile-time, such efforts are limited by the granularity
of the framework.)
An alternative approach is to create a notation intended for network
protocols, in order to deal with one or both of those limitations. Most research
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in this area is aimed at the first limitation, as it is the most difficult.
Notations or domain specific languages intended for network protocols
come in two varieties: permissive and strict.
Permissive notations. Permissive notations are designed primarily to make
implementation easy. These notations expose the behavior of the protocol, and
are often very flexible, but are not typically intended to address protocol de-
velopment problems formally and verifiably.
A fine example of a permissive notation is Prolac[41, 42]:
Prolac is a new statically-typed object-oriented programming lan-
guage designed for implementing network protocols. Prolac is de-
signed to make protocol specifications readable to human beings,
and thus more likely to be correct; easily extensible to accommo-
date protocol enhancements; and efficient when compiled.
Explicit goals of Prolac are readability, efficiency, evolvability, and behavioral
predictiblity. This predictability, however, does not come based on formal
reasoning, but rather on informal specifications and easing their translation
into code. Specifically, Kohler says,
[Problems with inflexible abstractions] caused us to leave all
protocol-specific abstractions out of our protocol language. Pro-
lac is a domain-specific language, in that many of its features,
both small and large, were formulated in direct response to how
protocols work; however, it is completely without domain-specific
abstractions.
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As a result, Prolac lacks a strong semantic grounding for verification. Ap-
proaches with similar, but less extreme, limitations are taken in Morpheus[3]
and Promela++[7].
On the other hand, Teapot[20], a language for writing cache coherence
protocols, is primarily a permissive notation, generating C code, but is also ca-
pable of generating a model specification for the MurΦ model checker[23]. The
combination, as described by Chandra[19], highlights the power of a domain-
specific language linked with formal methods.
Likewise, ESP[45, 43, 44] is a language for describing event-driven state
machines for programmable devices with limited CPU and memory resources.
The ESP compiler generates both efficient C code and Promela models for
checking the the state machines. However, ESP is not designed for network
protocols, and is not intended for human verification.
Strict notations. Strict notations are aimed primarily at making correct-
ness verification easy and only secondarily (if at all) at implementation. The
primary distinction among the strict notations is whether they are intended for
automatic model checking or manual verification. The notations intended for
automatic model checking often have a more complex, flexible structure, but
oppose that flexibility with tight limits necessary for efficient model checking,
such as a requirement that the models have a finite state. Notations intended
for manual verification have a much simpler structure, because the complexity
of the notation seriously impairs human verification, but do not place arbitrary
limits on the protocol under study.
Two strict, very abstract notations are Unity[21] and TLA+[47]. Un-
fortunately, as Chandy and Misra say when comparing Unity with other pro-
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gramming approaches, “[The] generality of Unity is also its limitation when
applied to a specific class of problems.” Other strict notations more focused
on communications are Estelle, LOTOS, and SDL[70], the UDP Calculus[64],
and Promela[34, 35, 36]. These notations differ in a number of areas, includ-
ing their complexity and ability to express network protocols specifically, but
all are grounded in high-level abstraction. The tools available for each lean
towards verification and model checking aids rather than executable inter-
preters or compilers. Indeed, due to the complexity and abstraction, protocols
compiled from these notations, if such is possible at all, frequently exhibit
poor performance. Finally, the compilers required are themselves complex
programs.
On the other end of the strict notations is Esterel[10]. Esterel is a
synchronous language intended for specifying protocol behavior abstractly, but
Castelluccia, et al.[18], describe a compiler for protocols that generates efficient
code. On the other hand, Esterel is not focused on message-passing network
protocols and it is neither sufficiently abstract to easily verify protocols nor
sufficiently simple to easily implement them.
1.6 The Austin Protocol Compiler
The Austin Protocol Compiler, and the Timed Abstract Protocol notation,
are the subject of this work. The Timed Abstract Protocol notation, or TAP,
is a small, simple language designed specifically for describing asynchronous
message-passing network protocols with the ultimate goal of verification. TAP
is based on the Abstract Protocol notation, or AP, developed by Gouda[31],
which takes a very abstract, high level approach to network protocols. Un-
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fortunately, like several of the other strict notations described previously, AP
makes very strong guarantees about time, concurrency, and failure that make
protocol verification easy but protocol implementation difficult.
For example, in AP a timeout is an action guarded by a global predicate:
the decision whether the action may be executed can potentially be based on
the values of variables in remote processes and the contents of the network
between processes as well as the local state. Also, AP guarantees that ac-
tions, made up of an arbitrary sequence of statements, and errors, which come
from a small class, must execute atomically and fairly, and that messages are
propagated through the channels of the network immediately.
The guarantees of AP make it impractical to implement directly. Fur-
ther, expressing some of the major sources of complexity in some protocols
is difficult, since AP does not provide a direct model of time. TCP[59, 15]
itself is one example that exposes this problem. This protocol is founded on
a sliding-window protocol for transferring data, but the majority of the com-
plexity in TCP involves when messages are to be sent—the round-trip time,
from the sender to the receiver and back, and the retransmission time for lost
messages are important factors to TCP. These factors are precisely those which
are difficult to express in the high-level of abstraction of AP.
Therefore, the Timed Abstract Protocol notation modifies AP slightly,
preserving the ease of verification while adding the ability to express temporal
behavior and moving slightly towards implementability. It also has two execu-
tion models: a high-level, abstract model allowing protocols to be understood
and verified readily, and a low-level, concrete model which makes efficient im-
plementation possible. The relationship between these two models, which is
described in detail later, is complex. However, in short, for many protocols the
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two models are equivalent—a protocol implemented according to the concrete
model behaves the same as a protocol understandable in the abstract model.
The final piece of the protocol development puzzle is the Austin Proto-
col Compiler, or APC, which can transform a process described in TAP into
executable code in C. The combination of the Timed Abstract Protocol nota-
tion with the Austin Protocol Compiler satisfies the original three classes of
network protocol development problems in the following ways:
1. The simple domain-specific language of TAP, with its underlying formal
model, addresses the intrinsic problems of protocol development through
its clarity and verifiability.
2. The clarity of the TAP language, along with the fast turn-around of a
compiler, allows practical experience with a protocol while it is still in
development.
3. The formal TAP notation, with its emphasis on the protocol’s details,
and the ability of the compiler to create a running reference model create
an environment where the compatibility problems in protocol develop-
ment can be handled.
The next chapter discusses the TAP notation in detail, and the follow-
ing chapter presents the two execution models. Subsequently, Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 argue the equivalence of the two execution models. Then, Chapter 6
describes the Austin Protocol Compiler and its runtime system. The following
two chapters present examples of the use of the TAP notation and APC. A
final chapter contains concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
The Timed Abstract Protocol
Notation
The Timed Abstract Protocol notation, or TAP, is designed to be a small lan-
guage for describing asynchronous, message passing network protocols. This
focus entails several features:
• TAP is intended to describe protocols which normally wait for an ex-
ternally generated event such as a received message or a timeout, then
perform local computation to handle the event. As a result, the processes
in TAP are made up of guarded actions, where the guards are based on
the availability of a received message, or a timeout occurance as well as
local state.
• Network protocols generally deal with two kinds of information: protocol
control information, which is mainly made up of integral values and
process addresses, and data, which is uninterpreted by the protocol.
Also, the processing of a protocol at a local level is usually simple and
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should terminate quickly. Following these two observations, the state
of processes is limited to minimal control information and the control
structures are kept simple. These limitations serve to ease understanding
and verification.
• Specialized operations, such as sending a message, are necessary for asyn-
chronous message passing protocols. These operations are integrated
into the language where they have specific semantics, again easing un-
derstanding and verification.
In TAP, a network protocol consists of two or more processes, which
communicate by sending messages across channels. In this chapter, we begin
to present the syntax and general semantics of TAP by discussing a simple
example protocol.
2.1 Messages and channels
In TAP, a message is a sequence of fields, where each field is either an integral
value consisting of protocol control information or a byte array containing
uninterpreted data. The integral fields can be either constant or variable;
constant fields can be used to distinguish messages while variable fields carry
protocol information. For example, Figure 2.1 shows two messages, each of
which has a single, constant field identifying it. Figure 2.1 does not show the
full range of options; variable fields would not specify values and data fields
would specify the field size in bytes, with either a constant or non-constant
expression.








type : 8 bits = 1
end
Figure 2.1: Request/reply messages.
the queue by the sending process and removed from the head by the receiving
process.
When discussing a protocol, the contents of a channel are referred to
by a sequence of messages surrounded by angle brackets and separated by
semicolons: <m;n>. A channel itself is referred to by the notation ch.p.q,
where p and q are the names of the sending process and the receiving process,
respectively.
In the TAP notation, channels are implicit—they are identified by the
abstract addresses of the sending and receiving processes. Since each process is
itself one of the endpoints, only the remote address is needed within a process;
the name of the process identifies the address of its local endpoint.
Every process is connected to every other process by channels in both
directions. As a result, every process can send messages to any other process
it has the address of.
2.2 Processes
A process consists of a local state and a set of actions describing the behavior




const q : address
var readyp : boolean = true
begin
readyp → send rqst to q;
readyp := false




var p : address
begin
rcv rqst from p →
send rply to p
end
Figure 2.2: Request/reply protocol, version 1.
The local state of a process is described by variables and constants, of
one of a number of data types. There are two data types used in processes p
and q in Figure 2.2:
1. An address is used to identify a channel between the current process
and another, either to send a message to another process or to recognize
the sender of a received message.1
2. A boolean is either true or false.
The remaining data type, integer, has values from 0 to 232 − 1. The
syntax of TAP also allows smaller ranges of integers as well as multidimensional
arrays of any of these data types.
1An address is special in that it cannot be assigned a literal value in TAP. Instead, its
value must be provided by the environment of the process. As described later, variable
addresses receive values when used in receive guards. Additionally, the Austin Protocol
Compiler runtime system provides the capability to set addresses outside the executable
code generated by the compiler.
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2.3 Actions
Actions describe the computation performed by a process. Each action consists
of a guard, describing the circumstances under which the action is enabled,
and a body, providing the statements which are executed when the action is
executed.
When discussing protocol computations, the individual actions are re-
ferred to by the notation p.n, where p is the name of the process and n is the
number of the action within the process. Similarly, p.id refers to a variable or
constant id in a process p.
There are two kinds of action guards in Figure 2.2:
1. A local guard is a Boolean predicate involving the local state of the
process. The action is enabled when the predicate is true. An example
of a local guard is that of p.1, the first action of process p in Figure 2.2.
The guard of this action is the predicate readyp.
2. A receive guard identifies a message and the address of a remote process
and is enabled when a matching message is at the head of the channel
from a remote process. An example is p.2, the second action of process
p. The guard of this action is rcv rply from q, which is enabled when
a rply message is at the head of the channel form q to p. When this
action is selected for execution, as discussed later, the rply message will
be removed from the channel.
Again, the address here is special—a receive guard with a constant ad-
dress will only be enabled when the matching message is at the head
of the channel from the process identified by the address. On the other
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hand, a receive guard with a variable address is enabled when the match-
ing message is at the head of the channel from any process; during the
execution of the action, the address variable takes as its value the address
of the remote process.
2.4 Statements
Most of the statements in TAP are relatively conventional. There are two
kinds of statements in Figure 2.2:
• The first is a send statement, send rqst to q. This statement inserts the
message rqst into ch.p.q.
• The second is an assignment statement, such as readyp := false. TAP
supports multiple assignment, where a list of variables on the left-hand-
side is matched by a list of expressions on the right-hand-side.
When a message is received or sent by an action, it introduces a message
structure that is local to the action. This message structure has records labeled
by the field names from the message. When a message is received, the records
contain the values of the fields from the incoming message. The values of the
fields of messages to be sent can be set by assigning to the records before
sending the message. These structures, however, do not participate in the
state of the process because they are not preserved between actions.
The statements are sequentially combined by separating them with a
semicolon.
Additional statements are also available in TAP:
• The skip statement does nothing.
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• A conditional statement,
if p0 → s0 [] p1 → s1 [] . . . [] pn → sn fi,
chooses a branch pi → si nondeterministically from the branches with
true predicates among p0, . . . pn and executes the corresponding state-
ment si.
• The iteration statement, do p → s od, executes statement s repeatedly,
as long as predicate p is true.
2.5 Protocol style
A number of issues apply to the design of protocols specified in the TAP
notation. One is illustrated in Figure 2.2: protocol quiesence. Another two
are loop termination, and conditional completeness.
The protocol should be quiescent: it should not be possible for any
process in the protocol to continue executing local actions indefinitely. An
action, in TAP, is executed when its guard is enabled; this is at variance with
AP, where an action is executed only when its guard is enabled. The difference
is that a process in TAP cannot wait when an action is enabled. For example,
process p in Figure 2.1 will flood the network with requests, waiting only to
receive the reply to each.
Instead, every process in the protocol should only execute a finite num-
ber of local actions before every local action becomes disabled—this prevents
the process from abusing local resources. Such a process can instead wait for
a message to be received or for a timeout to expire.
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A related issue is loop termination. Although neither process p nor pro-
cess q needs a do statement, other protocols will, and the necessity that actions
be atomic requires that loops terminate deterministically, and preferably after
performing only the computations needed by the protocol. This prevents the
execution of a single action from blocking all of the other computations of a
process.
Finally, the conditional statement syntactically uses multiple branches,
each with a boolean predicate and a body of statements. For clarity, the
predicates should be mutually exclusive, so that a single branch is possible in
any state, and the disjunction of the predicates should be true, so that some
branch is taken from any state.
2.6 Justification
The TAP notation is intended to specify message-passing network protocols
simply and clearly. Each of the features of the notation supports this goal:
1. The message specification describes the minimal features needed for most
common messages of existing protocols. It is neither as complete nor as
complex as other message specification languages such as ASN.1[24] and
XDR[67]. Instead, the TAP message notation is restricted to describing a
simple format which is interoperable with many Internet protocols while
allowing the programmer the flexibility to deal with other messages.
2. Processes have a simple structure, particularly in the definition of their
local state and the limited set of actions used to describe their behavior.
Coupled with the execution model, described in the next chapter, these
26
features make reasoning about network protocols easier.
3. Like Promela[36], Teapot[20], Esterel[10], and other formal notations,
TAP tries to avoid fine-grained data manipulation while expressing over-
all control structure. The statements describing the behavior of actions
are limited in number and simplified, when compared with general pur-
pose languages. This simplification, first, eases reasoning about the be-
havior, and second, reduces the tendency to include overly complex be-
havior or behavior unrelated to the network protocol in the specification.
This chapter has only described the basic syntax and semantics of TAP.
The details of TAP computations are the subject of the next chapter. However,
the next section contains a detailed discussion of the TAP language, based on
its grammar. Understanding the next section is not necessary in order to
understand subsequent chapters.
2.7 Details of TAP
In previous sections, we examined the TAP notation from an abstract view-
point, as a formal notation for specifying network protocols. Much of the
remainder of this work will continue with that viewpoint, but this section
examines the TAP notation as a programming language.
The discussion of the complete of the TAP language follows the struc-
ture of the TAP grammar—it re-covers the parts of TAP described previously
and includes features of TAP that will not be described fully until the next
chapter as well as features that are not further mentioned. The grammar is
described using the Extended Backus-Naur Format, with the following con-
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ventions:
• {...} indicates zero or more copies of the contained elements.
• [...] indicates zero or one copy of the contained elements; i.e. the contents
are optional.
• (...|...) indicates a choice between the contained elements.
• Literal text is presented in quotation marks.
• Non-literal token elements are in italics. There are three of these:
– A string is a quote-delimited string of characters which does not
span lines. Internal quotes and newlines can be escaped by a back-
slash. These strings cannot be manipulated in TAP, but can serve
as arguments to functions as well as to directives as described later.
– A number is one or more decimal digits, indicating a non-negative
number.
– An id is an identifier, made up of a letter followed by any number
of letters or numbers.
Parsing of each source file begins with the start symbol:
start ::= elements
elements ::= {element}





The source file given to the compiler consists of a sequence of elements.
Each element is either an import directive, an include directive, a message
definition, or a process definition.
The import directive looks for the file named in the string. The contents
of this file are read and processed by the compiler before any subsequent
elements in the current source file.
The include directive inserts a C include directive in the output file,
calling for the file named by the string. These included files form part of the
interface between the APC-generated C module and external C code.
2.7.1 Message syntax
message ::= m-header m-body
m-header ::= [“external”] “message” m-name [m-functs]
m-name ::= id
m-functs ::= “(” m-in “,” m-out “)”
m-in ::= id
m-out ::= id
m-body ::= “begin” fields “end”
fields ::= {field “,”} field
Each message definition consists of a header and a body. The message
header primarily provides a name for the message. The body of the message
is a sequence of fields, separated by commas. The message definition is used
by the compiler to produce:
1. A C structure with records for each field in the message.
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2. Parsing and marshalling functions, which interpret and recognize re-
ceived messages and convert a message structure to a sequence of bytes
for transmission, respectively.
Optionally, the message can be marked as external, in which case the
compiler does not generate the C functions for marshalling and parsing the
message. This allows the programmer to provide such functions, in order to
handle more complex messages than those that can be described by TAP. Also
optionally, two functions can be identified which process the message immedi-
ately after the fields in the message have been parsed (m-in) and immediately
before the message is sent (m-out). These functions receive the message buffer
as well as the structure describing the fields of the message, allowing them to
compute a checksum for the message, for example.
field ::= f-name “:” f-type [ “=” f-value ]
f-name ::= id
f-value ::= expression
Each field definition consists of a field-name, a field-type, and optionally,
a field-value. If the field-value is present, the field is considered constant; the
field is automatically set to that value before the message is sent and received
messages are checked to ensure the field contains the proper value as part of
the process of recognizing messages. In these expressions, the only allowable
values are constants and the names of previous fields.
f-type ::= f-size (“bits” | “bytes”)
f-size ::= expression
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A field-type describes the size and type of the contents of the field.
The expression describing the size can contain literal values or the names of
previous fields in the message. The type of the field is implied by the use of
bits or bytes to describe the field.2
• A bit field contains an unsigned integer value. The size expression de-
scribes the size of the field in bits; it must not be larger than 32 bits.
• A byte field contains a sequence of data bytes. The size expression
describes the size of the field in 8-bit bytes. For a received message,
the value of the record for the field in the structure generated by the
compiler will be a pointer to the data in the original message buffer.
When building a message to be sent, the value of the record should be
set to a pointer to a sequence of bytes which will remain valid until the
message is sent.
Each message has an additional field, named size, which indicates the
overall size of the message in bytes. When receiving a message terminating
with an arbitrary-length data field, the size field (minus the size of any previous
fields) provides the length of the final field. When sending such a message,
assigning to the size field allows the message marshalling functions to copy the
appropriate number of bytes from the array pointed to by the data field.
2.7.2 Process syntax
process ::= p-header p-body
p-header ::= “process” p-name [constants] [variables]




constants ::= “const” declarations
variables ::= “var” declarations
declarations ::= {declaration “;”} declaration
p-body ::= “begin” actions “end”
Each process definition also consists of a header and a body. The process
header provides a name for the process as well as the optional declarations for
the process’s constants and variables. The process’s body contains a sequence
of actions.
declaration ::= ids “:” type [“=” initial-value]
ids ::= {id “,”} id
type ::= “integer”
| number “..” number
| “boolean”
| “address”
| “array” “[” array-size “]” “of” type
array-size ::= number
initial-value ::= (number | “true” | “false”)
In each declaration, a sequence of identifiers which name constants or
variables are associated with a type and optionally an initial value. The basic
types allowed by TAP are 32-bit integers, booleans, and addresses. The integer
type can be specified as either a general integer or as a range of allowed values.
The initial values for variables or constants must match the type of the
variable or constant; the value of an integer is a number, and the value of a
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boolean is either true or false. Addresses may not be given an initial value in
TAP. (The initial value of an address can be given via the C interface while
initializing the APC runtime system. See Chapter 6 for more information.)
The only complex type supported by TAP is the array, with any number
of dimensions. The allowed indices of each array dimension is given by the
array-size value; indices range from 0 to the array-size−1. If an initial value
is given for an array, each element of the array is set to the value.
2.7.3 Action syntax
actions ::= {action “[]”} action
action ::= guard “->” statements
guard ::= (local-guard | receive-guard | timeout-guard)
local-guard ::= expression
receive-guard ::= “rcv” m-name “from” address
address ::= id
timeout-guard ::= “timeout” t-name
t-name ::= id
In a TAP process, actions are separated by a box, written as two square
brackets: []. Each action consists of a guard and a sequence of statements.
There are three forms of guards: local, receive, and timeout. Chapter 3 de-
scribes the behavior of each of the guards in more detail, and Chapter 6 con-
tains the details of the runtime support for each guard.
Local guards are made up of a predicate, a boolean expression. The
action is enabled when the guard evaluates to true.
Receive guards specify a message accepted by the action and an address.
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The guard may be enabled if and only if the received message matches the
message specified by the receive guard. If the address is a constant, then the
action will only be enabled if the message is from the process identified by
the address. If the address is a variable, then the action will be enabled no
matter where the message is from and the address will be set to the source of
the message.
Timeout actions provide a name, t-name, for the action for use with
the activation statement; the behavior of such actions is described in the next
chapter.
2.7.4 Statement syntax
statements ::= {statement “;”} statement
statement ::= “skip” | function-call | assignment | send
| conditional | loop | activate
In any sequence of statements, the individual statements are separated
by semicolons. The two fundamental statements are skip, which does nothing,
and a function call, which invokes a C function and is more fully described on
page 37.
assignment ::= left-sides “:=” expressions
left-sides ::= {left-side “,”} left-side
left-side ::= (id | field-reference | array-reference)
expressions ::= {expression “,”} expression
TAP assignment statements allow multiple values to be assigned simul-
taneously; in the code generated by the APC compiler, each expression is
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evaluated independently and stored in a temporary location. Subsequently,
the values are assigned to the left-hand-side locations. Locations which can
be assigned values are either variables, message fields, or array elements.
send ::= “send” m-name “to” address
A fundamental operation in TAP is sending a message, identified by
m-name, to a process, identified by the address. Any necessary fields in the
message should be set before executing the send statement.
conditional ::= “if” guarded-statements “fi”
guarded-statements ::= {guarded-statement “[]”} guarded-statement
guarded-statement ::= expression “->” statements
TAP provides a conditional statement with guarded branches separated
by the box. Each branch consists of a boolean expression guarding a sequence
of statements. In execution, one branch with a true-valued expression is chosen
and executed. If no branches are enabled, execution continues with the next
statement after the conditional.
loop ::= “do” expression “->” statements “od”
The iteration statement in TAP is made up of a single guarded state-
ment, which provides a sequence of statements which are executed repeatedly
as long as the expression evaluates to true.
activate ::= “act” t-name “in” delay
delay ::= expression
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The activate statement, along with the timeout guards, is discussed
in detail in Chapter 3. In general terms, it sets a timer associated with the
timeout guard identified by t-name. The delay gives the value of the timer,
after which the timeout guard enables the corresponding action.
2.7.5 Expression syntax
In order to simplify the description of the TAP expression, the grammar rule
is broken into a number of sub-rules below. The expression rule is the combi-
nation of all of the individual sub-rules.
expression ::= (id | number | “true” | “false” | string)
The fundamental expressions in TAP are variable names, numbers, true




field-reference ::= m-name “.” (f-name | “size”)
array-reference ::= (array-reference | id) “[” expression “]”
function-call ::= function-name “(” [ expressions ] “)”
function-name ::= id
Further expressions are field references, array references, and function
calls. Field references are described by a message name and either a field
within the message or the special field, “size”, which contains the overall size
of the message in bytes.
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Array references follow the traditional syntax, with a numeric expres-
sions describing the element within the array.
A function call identifies a C function by name and executes it with the
arguments given by the expressions. The C type of the return value of the
function should be one of:
• void, for functions called as statements,
• unsigned long, for integer values, or
• unsigned char *, for an assignment to a message’s data field.
expression ::= “(” expression “)”
| expression binary-operator expression
| unary-operator expression
binary-operator ::= “=” | “>” | “<” “<=” | “>=” | “<>”
| “|” | “&” | “+” | “-” | “*” | “/”
unary-operator ::= “˜” | “-”
The next group of general expressions include the normal binary and
unary operators. The binary operators are equality, inequality, boolean oper-
ators, and arithmetic operators. Unary operators are boolean and arithmetic
negation.
These operators have the precedence described in Figure 2.3.
expression ::= “size”
The final form of expression, a bare reference to a size message field, is
only valid in an expression that is part of a message definition. The value of
the “size” expression is the overall size of the message in bytes.
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1 “˜” “-” (unary)
Figure 2.3: TAP operator precedence, from lowest to highest.
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Chapter 3
Execution Models of Network
Protocols
3.1 Two Models
An execution model for a programming notation describes the basic features
of the computations for programs in the notation. These features include,
for example, what information is captured at a state of the computation,
what events can happen at each state, and the actual behavior of the events
described in the notation.
With sequential languages, only one execution model is needed. A single
execution model can support both:
• Effective reasoning about the program described in the notation, to pro-
duce both a clear, elegant design as well as arguments about the correct
behavior of the program.
• Simple and efficient implementation of the program.
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However, when the environment becomes more complex, as it does in
the case of message-passing network protocols, a single model may not be
sufficient. In fact, attempting to satisfy both goals in a single model may
result in satisfying neither.
This chapter presents two models for the execution of the Timed Ab-
stract Protocol notation:
• The abstract model is intended to make protocol verification easy and to
allow clear and elegant design. This model abstracts away many details
of protocol execution and is not representative of reality.
• The concrete model is intended to be easily implemented, with no fea-
tures that would be complex or inefficient to provide in a running system.
With two models, a single protocol has two meanings. This chapter de-
scribes the two models and the next two chapters demonstrate the relationship
between the two models and show under what conditions they are equivalent.
3.2 Abstract Execution Model
The abstract execution model is intended to provide a conceptual framework
for thinking about network protocols. Since the environment of network proto-
cols is complex, it is necessary for an abstract model to make strong, unrealistic
assumptions. The goals of these assumptions are to simplify reasoning about
network protocols while still providing a useful model representing the network
protocol environment.
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3.2.1 Abstract protocol state
The state of a protocol in the abstract execution model consists entirely of:
• The values of the variables of every process in the protocol, and
• The contents of the channel between each pair of process.
In the abstract execution model, when the protocol begins execution, the val-
ues of the variables of the initial state of each process are given in the process
definition and all of the channels are empty.
3.2.2 Abstract protocol execution
The computation of the protocol in the abstract model consists of a sequence
of action executions, moving the protocol from one state to the next. The com-
putation of a protocol proceeds under the following assumptions concerning
atomicity, message propagation, and fairness:
• Global atomicity: Only one action is executed at a time. At each state,
one action from all of the enabled actions in all of the processes in the
protocol is nondeterministically chosen and executed.
• Immediate message propagation: When a message is sent, if it is the
first message in the channel, then the receiving action for that message
is enabled for execution at the next state.
• Global fairness: In computation consisting of an infinite number of
states, if an action becomes enabled at a state then it is either disabled
or chosen for execution at a subsequent state.
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From these assumptions, the computation of the request/reply protocol
of Figure 2.2 can be understood. At the initial state, readyp is true and the
channels are empty, so p.1 is the only enabled action. That action sends a rqst
message to process q, and sets readyp to false. At the second state, q.1 is the
only enabled action, and this action receives the rqst message and responds
with a rply message. At the third state, p.2 is the only enabled action, and it
sets readyp to true, returning the protocol to the initial state. Computation





p.2 State 1: readyp ∧ ch.p.q = <> ∧ ch.q.p = <>
State 2: ¬readyp ∧ ch.p.q = <rqst> ∧ ch.q.p = <>
State 3: ¬readyp ∧ ch.p.q = <> ∧ ch.q.p = <rply>
Figure 3.1: State transitions for the request/reply protocol, version 1.
Unfortunately, the actual behavior of a network protocol is not this neat
and the model so far presented is too unrealistic. At a minimum, it leaves out
an important aspect of network protocol behavior: faults.
3.2.3 Abstract faults
The only faults described in the abstract execution model are message faults,
which are the most common faults that network protocols must deal with.
There are four possible message faults:
1. Message loss: A message in a channel is removed from the channel.
2. Message corruption: A message in a channel is replaced with the special
message, error, which indicates that the message has been corrupted in
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some fashion.
3. Message reordering: The order of two messages in the same channel is
swapped. A channel containing <m;n> subsequently contains <n;m>.
4. Message duplication: A message in a channel is duplicated. A channel
containing <m> subsequently contains <m;m>.
The specific faults that a protocol may face depend on the environ-
ment in which the protocol executes. For example, if the protocol is intended
to execute in an environment that provides message checksums, the possibil-
ity of message corruption is eliminated—a message corruption failure will be
transformed into a message loss failure.
The message faults are treated almost identically to the other actions;
if a channel contains a suitable message or messages, fault actions are enabled
and can be chosen and executed. However, in a computation consisting of an
infinite number of states, faults are rare: There can only be a finite number
of faults.
With the addition of message faults, the request/reply protocol of Fig-
ure 2.2 has problems. On the one hand, the protocol need not deal with
message reordering since the protocol has only one message in any channel at
a time. Also, additional actions could be easily be added to the two processes
to receive corrupt error messages and the protocol could be made to recog-
nize duplicated messages by using message sequence numbers. On the other
hand, if either the rqst or rply is lost, the protocol deadlocks. Each of the
processes waits for a message that cannot arrive, and the TAP language as so
far described provides no method of escaping this deadlock. The solution is
the subject of the next section.
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3.2.4 Abstract timeout behavior
In order to handle message loss, TAP has an additional action guard and an
additional statement:
• The timeout guard, timeout t, provides a name, t, for the action. This
name is used by the activation statement.
• The activation statement, act t in d, provides a delay, d, between the
activation statement being executed and the timeout action t becoming
enabled. For the request/reply protocol in this abstract model, the delay
is essentially arbitrary—any non-zero delay will have the same behavior.
However, in a protocol with multiple timeout actions or multiple delays,
the delay values will describe the relative behavior of the timeouts.
Every timeout guard has a time variable associated with it, which either
is null or has a numeric delay. Initially, the value of every time variable is null.
The execution of an activation statement with a timeout guard name t sets
the value of the time variable associated with the timeout guard t to the delay
given in the activation statement.
At any abstract state where no action is enabled, the values of all of
the non-null time variables are reduced by the value of the smallest non-null
time variable, making the value of the smallest time variable or variables zero.
A time variable with a zero value enables the associated timeout guard, and
at a state where any time variable has a value of zero, only a timeout action
can be executed. The execution of the timeout action resets its time variable
to null.
Figure 3.2 shows process p with the addition of an activation statement
and an action with a timeout guard. This version of the process, intended
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process p
const q : address
var readyp : boolean = true
begin
readyp → send rqst to q;
act rsnd in 1000;
readyp := false
[] rcv rply from q → readyp := true
[] timeout rsnd → send rqst to q;
act rsnd in 1000
end
Figure 3.2: Request/reply protocol, version 2.
to handle message loss, executes an activation statement after sending a rqst,
and the corresponding timeout action resends the rqst. Process q remains the
same as in Figure 2.2.
In process p, the timeout delay used by the activation statements is
1000 ms, which must be an upper bound on the round-trip delay, by assump-
tion. To avoid such assumptions, a protocol should simply choose the delay
sensibly or dynamically adjust the delay, but will need to be prepared to handle
duplicated messages.
3.2.5 Abstract execution of the request/reply protocol
The execution of the request/reply protocol of Figure 3.2 is more complex
than the execution described on page 42. Figure 3.3 shows the state diagram
of the protocol. In this diagram, State 1 represents situations where readyp is
true and process p can send a rqst. States 2 and 3 represent situations with a












State 2: ¬readyp ∧ ch.p.q = <rqst>
State 3: ¬readyp ∧ ch.q.p = <rply>
State 4: ¬readyp
Figure 3.3: State transitions for the request/reply protocol, ver-
sion 2. Channels not described are empty and transitions labelled
“loss” represent message losses.
Process p from Figure 3.2 retransmits the rqst message when one is lost.
At State 4, both ch.p.q and ch.q.p are empty and no actions are enabled. The
time variable for the rsnd timeout action is reduced to zero and the timeout
action is executed, resending the rqst message and returning the protocol to
State 2. Since a message could be lost again, it also re-executes the activation
statement, resetting the time variable.
3.2.6 Justification
The main goal of the abstract model is to provide a conceptually simple ab-
straction of the network protocol environment. The features of the abstract
model combine to satisfy this goal:
1. Global atomicity and immediate message propagation limit the number
of states that the model can be in, as well as the number of transitions
between states.
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2. The model of message faults abstracts the general faults that a protocol
may be subject to, retaining those that are realistically common.
3. The timeout behavior abstracts the passage of real time without refer-
ence to a clock. Again, this limits the number of states of the model.
The timeout behavior also provides a flexible mechanism for describing
protocols with time-based features.
4. Global fairness ensures progress in the protocol. If the correctness of
the protocol requires the execution of a specific action and that action
becomes enabled and is not subsequently disabled before it is executed,
then it is guaranteed to eventually be executed.
The behavior of the abstract model described in this section is unrealis-
tic, but is almost reasonable. Another execution model, much closer to reality,
is described later. The relationship between the abstract model and the con-
crete model, and the requirements made on protocols by that relationship, is
the subject of the next two chapters.
3.3 Concrete Execution Model
Unlike the abstract execution model, the concrete execution model is designed
to closely resemble the execution environment of a network protocol, including
simultaneous events, delayed message propagation, clock-based timeouts, and
local fairness.
As in the abstract execution model, when a protocol begins execution,
the channels are empty and the values of the variables at the initial state of
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each process are given in the process definition. The computation also proceeds
in a sequence of action executions.
3.3.1 Concrete protocol state
The state of a protocol in the concrete model has a more complex structure
than that of the protocol in the abstract model. In addition to variables, each
process has an execution pointer, which either indicates the next statement to
be executed in an action of the process or takes a null value when no action is
being executed by the process. Also, rather than consisting of a single queue,
the channel between each pair of processes p and q is divided into two queues,
an incoming queue of ch.p.q and an outgoing queue of ch.p.q. When a process
p sends a message m to process q, message m is placed at the tail of the
incoming queue of ch.p.q. Later, m is moved from the head of the incoming
queue of ch.p.q to the tail of the outgoing queue of ch.p.q. Finally, process q
receives m, removing it from the head of the outgoing queue.
3.3.2 Concrete protocol execution
The execution of the protocol is broken into events. Each event is one of:
1. An action choice. In this event, which is possible when a process has
a null execution pointer and an enabled local or receive action guard,
one enabled action of the process is nondeterministically chosen and the
execution pointer of the process is set to the first statement of that action.
If the chosen action has a receive guard, then this event also removes the
message specified by the guard from the head of the outgoing queue of
the channel.
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2. The execution of a skip statement.
3. The execution of an assignment statement.
4. The execution of a send statement. In this event, the message is inserted
into the incoming queue of the specified channel.
5. The execution of a timeout activation statement.
6. The execution of a conditional choice. This event is possible when the
execution pointer points to either a conditional statement or an iteration
statement. If the pointer points to a conditional statement, one branch is
nondeterministically chosen from the enabled branches and the execution
pointer is set to the first statement of that branch. If no branch is
enabled, the execution pointer is set to the next statement in the action
being executed. If the execution pointer points to an iteration statement
and the iteration guard is true, the execution pointer is set to the first
statement of the iteration body. Otherwise, the execution pointer is set
to the next statement in the action being executed or to null, if the
conditional is the final statement of the action.
7. A fault occurance.
8. A message transmission. In this event, a message is moved from the head
of the incoming queue of a channel to the tail of the outgoing queue of
the same channel.
9. A timer advance. Timeout behavior in the concrete model is described
on page 53. However, the timer advance event possibly sets the execution
pointer of one or more processes to the first statement of an action with
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a timeout guard; in this case, it also sets the time variable associated
with the action to null.
Events 1-6 are executed in some process in TAP. Events 2, 3, 4 and 5 set
the execution pointer of the process to the next statement in the action being
executed. When one of these events is the final statement of an action, the
execution pointer is set to null.
A concrete computation of the protocol consists of a sequence of steps
moving the protocol from one state to the next, starting with the initial state
of the protocol. A step in a concrete computation consists of one or more
simultaneous events such that, for any two events e1 and e2 occurring in the
same step, the following conditions hold:
1. Process execution. There are six types of events describing the execution
of actions in a process:
(a) Choosing an action, Event 1.
(b) Executing a skip, Event 2.
(c) Executing an assignment, Event 3.
(d) Sending a message, Event 4.
(e) Activating a timeout, Event 5.
(f) Evaluating a conditional choice, Event 6.
If e1 is one of these events for some action in a process, then e2 cannot
be one of these events for any action in the same process.
2. Action choice. If e1 is an action choice event, Event 1, in some pro-
cess, then the execution pointer of that process at the concrete state
immediately before the step is null.
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3. Action execution. There are five types of events describing the execution
of statements of an action in a process:
(a) Executing a skip, Event 2.
(b) Executing an assignment, Event 3.
(c) Sending a message, Event 4.
(d) Activating a timeout, Event 5.
(e) Evaluating a conditional choice, Event 6.
If e1 is one of these events for some statement in an action in a process,
then the execution pointer of that process at the state immediately before
the step points to that statement.
4. Message operation. There are four types of events operating on a mes-
sage:
(a) Sending a message, Event 4.
(b) Transmitting a message, Event 8.
(c) Choosing an action which receives a message, Event 1.
(d) A fault occurrence on a message, Event 7.
If e1 is one of these events, e2 cannot be one of these events operating
on the same message.
5. Message transmission. If e1 is a message transmission event in some
channel, Event 8, then e2 cannot be another message transmission event
in the same channel.
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6. Timer advance. A timer advance event, Event 9, cannot occur in a step
with any other event.
The concrete execution model can be described as locally atomic, since the ac-
tions within each process are executed atomically. However, different processes
execute in parallel, and many events can occur in the same step.
3.3.3 Delayed message propagation
The channels between processes are separated into two queues. When a mes-
sage is sent from process p to process q, the message enters the incoming queue
of channel ch.p.q, where it does not enable a receive action in process q even
if it is the first message in the channel. A separate event, a message transmis-
sion, is needed to move the message from the incoming queue of ch.p.q to the
outgoing queue of the same channel. When a message is at the head of the
outgoing queue of ch.p.q, then the corresponding receive guard is enabled.
3.3.4 Concrete faults
The concrete model includes all of the faults listed on page 42: message loss,
message corruption, message reordering, and message duplication.
For simplicity, all faults in the concrete execution model occur when
the message suffering the fault is in the outgoing queue of the channel. (There
is no loss of generality in this requirement, since any fault in the incoming
queue before the message is transmitted is equivalent to the same fault in the
outgoing queue, after the message has been transmitted.)
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3.3.5 Concrete timeout behavior
The concrete execution model includes the timeout activation statement and
the timeout guard as described on page 44, with the activation statement
behaving exactly as in the abstract execution model. However, the concrete
model includes an event called a timer advance, Event 9, which is allowed
whenever a time variable is non-null at any state where the execution pointers
of all processes are null. Each timer advance reduces the values of all non-
null time variables by one; if any time variable becomes zero, then the timer
advance resets the time variable to null and sets the execution pointer of the
process with the associated timeout action to the first statement of the timeout
action.
3.3.6 Local fairness
In the concrete execution model, execution is locally fair: In a computation
consisting of an infinite number of states,
1. If an action in a given process becomes enabled, eventually either that
process will execute the action or the action will be disabled.
2. A message in the incoming queue of a channel will eventually be trans-
mitted to the outgoing queue.
This condition differs from the global fairness condition in that it only describes
the execution within a single process, not throughout the network protocol.
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3.3.7 Concrete execution of the request/reply protocol
The flavor of the execution of the request/reply protocol can be found in the
sequence of steps in Figure 3.4. Each line horizontally represents a step; the
left column shows events in the execution of process p and the right column
shows events in the execution of process q. Each event in the figure is followed
by the identifying number of the event in parentheses. The first four steps show
the execution of the action from process p guarded by readyp. The next three
steps show two timer advances and the transmission of the request message in
ch.q.p. The next two steps show the execution of the action of process q. The
next step shows the transmission of the reply message in ch.q.p. The final two
steps show the execution of the receive action of process p.
readyp = true (1)
send rqst to q (4)
act rsnd in 1000 (5)
readyp, out := false, out + 1 (3)
transmit rqst on ch.p.q (8)
rcv rqst from p (1)
send rply to p (4)
transmit rply on ch.q.p (8)
rcv rply from q (1)
readyp := true (3)
...
Figure 3.4: Computation steps for request/reply protocol. Each
line horizontally represents a step; the left column shows events in
the execution of process p and the right column shows events in
the execution of process q.
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3.3.8 Justification
The concrete execution model is designed to represent the normal execution
environment of an asynchronous, message passing network protocol. It does
so in the following ways:
• Local atomicity models the execution of a group of processes: each pro-
cess serially executes its actions, but multiple processes execute in par-
allel.
• The channels between processes can take an arbitrary time to deliver a
message, even with no faults.
• Local fairness allows a computation to delay an action with a enabled
local predicate indefinitely by executing other enabled actions. On the
other hand, message and timeouts are acted on fairly.
Clearly, the concrete execution model differs from the abstract execution
model. However, the two execution models can be shown to be equivalent for
a rich class of protocols. This equivalence is discussed in the next chapter.
3.4 Limitations of the Execution Models
The execution models described in this chapter are primarily intended to de-
scribe the common execution environments of network protocols. In order to
do this, they omit a number of features which are important in certain specific
situations.





4. Unrecognized message faults.
5. Security vulnerabilities.
Process errors. In both the abstract and the concrete execution mod-
els, processes cannot exhibit any failures. This assumption is certainly
unrealistic—there are a number of possible failure modes which may be im-
portant to a specific network protocol:
• The simplest failure mode is a process crash. In a crash, a process which
is not currently executing an action fails permanently, ceasing to respond
to incoming messages and no longer generating outgoing messages.
In AP, it is possible to simulate a process crash with a small number of
additions to a process:
1. Add an initially true boolean variable, active, to the process.
2. Add an activity action to the process:
true → active := false
3. Add an activity condition to every action: ensure that every other
local action guard is of the form
active ∧ . . .
and that the body of every action with a receive or timeout guard
is of the form
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if ¬active → skip
[] active → . . .
fi
As a result of these changes, the process will, at some point in its com-
putation, appear to fail.
The simulated crash is unsatisfactory in TAP because a process in TAP is
viewed as a specification rather than a model—specifying that a process
will crash is considerably different from allowing the possibility that it
will crash. The difference is demonstrated by the semantics of actions
in TAP, where an action with a true local guard will immediately be
executed.
• A more complex failure mode is a process crash during the execution of an
action. The global atomicity of the abstract execution model precludes
such a failure, since action execution is an all-or-nothing affair.
• Finally, a process may fail in such a way as to continue to operate while
sending incorrect messages to other processes, a Byzantine failure.
Allowing any of these errors requires modification of both of the execution
models.
Process termination. A related option is the possibility of allowing a pro-
cess to voluntarily terminate. In the execution models, all protocol executions
are infinite and no process ever terminates.
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Time errors. One assumption made by both execution models is that time
passes at the same rate throughout the network. However, it is possible that
some process may have a faulty clock, in which case time, for that process,
would appear to pass faster, slower, or erratically. A faulty clock would alter
the execution of actions with timeout guards for that process.
Unrecognized message faults. A final limitation of the execution mod-
els is the assumption that message corruption is recognizable by the process
receiving the message. Unfortunately, it is possible that a message may be-
come corrupted so that the corruption is unrecognized but the data or protocol
control information in the message is altered.
Security vulnerabilities. If security correctness is to be addressed as part
of a network protocol, a model of the security vulnerabilities in the execution
of the protocol is needed. Such vulnerabilities include message modification,






The relationship between the abstract and concrete models is one of implemen-
tation: the abstract model of a protocol P in TAP represents the specification
of P whereas the concrete model of P represents its implementation.
This relationship is complex. On the one hand, they share the same
notation and fundamental operations, but on the other, they have different
operational assumptions. Fortunately, the two models are equivalent for a large
class of protocol computations. In other words, it is possible to demonstrate
that a protocol that behaves correctly in the abstract model will also behave
correctly in the concrete model, and vice versa.
In order to demonstrate the equivalence of the abstract execution model
from page 40 and the concrete execution model from page 47, a number of
terms and relationships first need to be defined.
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4.1 Protocol states
The state of a protocol in a model describes all of the useful information about
the protocol at a point in its computation, specifically determining the next
transitions that are possible.
An abstract state of a protocol in the abstract execution model is made
up of:
• The values of all variables in all processes in the protocol, and
• The contents of all channels between processes in the protocol.
A concrete state of a protocol in the concrete execution model is made
up of:
• The values of all variables in all processes in the protocol,
• The values of the execution pointers of all processes in the protocol, and
• The contents of all incoming and outgoing queues of channels between
processes in the protocol.
For convenience, we adopt the notation that abstract states are named
as, at, and so on, whereas concrete states are named cs, ct, and so on. When
discussing corresponding states, a hub state cs corresponds to an abstract
state as, a hub state ct corresponds to an abstract state at, and so on.
In the concrete execution model, the extent of an event consists of the
variables, execution pointers, and messages in the concrete states before and
after the step with the event. Specifically,
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1. The extent of an action choice event, Event 1, consists of the variables
and execution pointer of the process executing the event, and the mes-
sages at the head of the outgoing queues of the channels terminating
with the process.
2. The extent of a skip event, Event 2, consists of the execution pointer of
the process executing the event.
3. The extent of an assignment event, Event 3, consists of the variables and
execution pointer of the process executing the event.
4. The extent of a send event, Event 4, consists of the execution pointer of
the process executing the send statement and the message being inserted
into the incoming queue of a channel.
5. The extent of a timeout activation event, Event 5, consists of the exe-
cution pointer of the process executing the activation statement and the
time variable associated with the timeout guard being activated.
6. The extent of a conditional choice event, Event 6, consists of the variables
and execution pointer of the process executing the event.
7. The extent of a fault occurrence, Event 7, consists of the message or
messages altered or destroyed by the event.
8. The extent of a message transmission, Event 8, is the message being
transmitted.
9. The extent of a timer advance event, Event 9, consists of all of the exist-
ing time variables and the execution pointers of the processes containing
those time variables.
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Further, two events in the concrete execution model are independent if
and only if the extents of the two events do not overlap, in which case the
events do not observe or modify the same variables, time variables, process
execution pointers, or messages.
4.2 Equivalent protocol states
A concrete state is a hub state if and only if:
• The values of the execution pointers of all processes in the state are null.
• The incoming queue of each channel in the state is empty.
Informally, every hub state corresponds to some abstract state. At a hub state
in a computation of some protocol, the next event in the execution of every
process will be to begin an action, and since every message in a channel is in
the outgoing queue of the channel, the actions that are enabled are the same
as in the corresponding abstract state.
An abstract state, as, and a corresponding concrete state, cs, of the
same protocol are equivalent if and only if the following conditions hold:
• cs is a hub state.
• The values of the variables in as are equal to the values of the variables
in cs.
• The sequence of messages in the outgoing queue of each channel in cs is
identical to the sequence of messages in the corresponding channel in as.
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Every abstract state is equivalent to some hub state, but not every
concrete state is equivalent to an abstract state; in particular, the non-hub
states are not equivalent to any abstract state.
4.3 State transitions
An abstract transition is a pair of abstract states, as and at, such that there
is an action or error enabled at as and the execution of this action or the
occurrence of this error leads to at.
A concrete transition is a pair of concrete states, cs and ct, such that
there is a step consisting of one or more events each allowed at cs and the
simultaneous execution of the step leads to ct.
4.4 Computations
An abstract computation of a protocol is a possibly infinite sequence of abstract
states of the protocol beginning with the initial state of the protocol, such that
every pair of successive states is an abstract transition.
A concrete computation of a protocol is a possibly infinite sequence of
concrete states of the protocol beginning with the initial state of the protocol,
such that every pair of successive states is a concrete transition.
4.5 Whole computations
It is possible to have a concrete computation that cannot be related to an
abstract computation simply because, at every state of the concrete computa-
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tion, some action is always in the process of being executed; in other words,
an execution pointer of at least one process is non-null at each state of the
concrete computation. In such a computation, there are no hub states after
the initial state. Also, since timer advance events are allowed in any concrete
state where all of the execution pointers are null, it is possible to have a con-
crete computation where timeouts happen too fast: where every time variable
is reduced to zero immediately after it is created and the associated timeout
action is executed before it would be in the abstract model.
However, a class of finite concrete computations, called whole compu-
tations, can be defined so that any concrete computation in this class can
be related to a finite abstract computation. A whole computation is a finite
concrete computation in which:
1. The final state of the concrete computation is a hub state.
2. Only hub states with no enabled action guards are the initial states of
transitions with timer advance events.
While both of these requirements are chosen for technical reasons, they
do have intuitional justifications. For the first requirement, a final hub state
for any finite concrete computation can be identified by appending the re-
maining events from the incomplete action executions as well as the message
transmission events for the messages in the incoming queue of any channel. For
the second requirement, if the amount of time described by a timer advance
is greater than the duration of the execution of an action, it is reasonable to
assume that the processes execute each enabled action without delays. As a
result, the protocol spends most of its running time waiting.
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4.6 Equivalent computations
Let P be a protocol specified in TAP, PA be a finite abstract computation of
P , and PC be a whole concrete computation of P .
The two computations PA and PC are equivalent if and only if:
1. The final state of PA is equivalent to the final state of PC .
2. The sequence of actions and faults executed in PA is the same as the
sequence of actions and faults executed in PC .
Since actions in the concrete execution model are not atomic, for an ac-
tion to be executed in PC means that the events making up the execution
of the action are executed in sequence in PC .
The two requirements indicate that equivalent computations end equiv-
alently, and in the process of execution behave equivalently.
4.7 Proof of equivalence
In order to demonstrate that the abstract execution model and the concrete
execution model are equivalent, we will prove that the models satisfy the
following two conditions for any protocol P specified in TAP that satisfies the
conditions we have described:
1. Implementation consistency: For any whole concrete computation PC ,
there exists an equivalent finite abstract computation PA.
2. Implementation completeness: For any finite abstract computation PA,
there exists an equivalent finite concrete computation PC . (It will turn
out that PC is whole.)
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Figure 4.1 presents a graphical representation of the two conditions. The set
A is made up of finite abstract computations of protocol P and the set C is




Figure 4.1: The execution model relationship. A is the set of finite
abstract computations of protocol P specified in TAP and C is the
set of whole concrete computations for P .
In the next section, we prove that the implementation consistency con-
dition holds, and in the following section we prove that the implementation
completeness condition holds.
4.8 Implementation consistency
In this section, we demonstrate that the implementation consistency condition
holds by transforming the whole concrete computation PC of a protocol P
specified in TAP into an equivalent concrete computation P ′C of P , which is
itself equivalent to an abstract computation PA of P . P
′
C is constructed from
PC by serialization and reordering.
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4.8.1 Event serialization
The computation PC of a process P specified in TAP consists of a sequence
of transitions, where each transition is a step made up of one or more events.
The first transformation serializes each step of PC , resulting in a computation
consisting of a sequence of transitions made up of single events. Fortunately,
this transformation is possible because simultaneous events in the concrete
execution model are independent.
Theorem 1 Any two events that occur in the same step of a concrete compu-
tation of a protocol are independent.
Proof
Let e1 and e2 be two events that occur in the same step of PC .
• If e1 is an event in the execution of an action, e2 must not be an event in
the execution of an action from the same process by the process execu-
tion condition described on page 50, Rule 1. Since the execution model
does not allow shared variables, they cannot observe or modify the same
variables, time variables, or execution pointer.
• If e1 is an event operating on a message, e2 cannot operate on the same
message, by the message operations condition, Rule 4.
• If e1 is a message transmission, e2 cannot also be a transmission on the
same channel, by the message transmission condition, Rule 5.
Therefore, e1 and e2 cannot observe or modify the same variables, time vari-
ables, execution pointers, or messages, and e1 and e2 are independent.
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Given that any two events in the same step are independent, a step
consisting of more than one event can be transformed into a sequence of steps.
cs ct
cs cs′ ct
e1, e2, ..., en
1 step
e1 e2, ..., en
2 steps
becomes
Figure 4.2: The serialization transformation.
Theorem 2 (Serialization) A step consisting of n simultaneous events,
where n > 1, can be converted to a sequence of two steps, the first consist-
ing of one event and the second consisting of n − 1 events, such that if the
original step starts at state cs and yields state ct, and if the sequence starts
at state cs, then the sequence will also yield state ct. (See Figure 4.2.)
Proof
Consider two transitions:
• A concrete transition made up of a step consisting of events e1, e2, ...en
beginning in cs and ending in ct, and
• A sequence of two transitions beginning in cs, the first transition made
up of a step consisting of e1 and ending in cs
′, and the second transition
beginning in cs′ and made up of a step consisting of e2, ...en and ending
in ct′.
By Theorem 1, e1 must be independent of all of e2...en. Therefore, all of
the extents of e2...en remain unchanged from cs to cs
′ in the sequence and
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the extent of e1 remains unchanged from cs
′ to ct′ in the sequence by e2...en.
Therefore, ct′ is equivalent to ct.
Let P sC be the concrete computation constructed by repeatedly serial-
izing the transitions in PC , such that all transitions in P
s
C consist of steps of a
single event.
1. Since the serialization transformation only introduces states, all of the
states in PC occur in P
s
C in order, although they may be separated by
intermediate states.
2. All of the events in PC occur in P
s
C , and those events which are not
simultaneous in PC occur in the same order.
3. For all of the events in any transition of PC , the extent of the event is
equal to the extent of the same event in P sC .
For the remainder of this chapter, we consider only this serialized com-
putation P sC .
4.8.2 Event reordering
The serialized concrete computation P sC consists of a sequence of transitions
made up of single-event steps, where the events from the execution of an action
in one process can be interleaved with the events from the execution of actions
from other processes and with faults. The second transformation reorders the
steps of P sC to produce an equivalent computation which is itself equivalent to
an abstract computation.
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A serialized concrete computation is uninterrupted if the following con-
ditions hold:
1. Abstract action atomicity. All steps with events in the execution of
an action (Events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) are not separated by any steps
with events from the execution of any other action, faults (Event 7), or
timer advances (Event 9).
2. Abstract message transmission. Every event sending a message
(Event 4) is immediately followed by the message transmission event
(Event 8) for that message.
3. Abstract timer advance. The timer advance event reducing a time
variable to zero occurs only in a hub state where all other actions are
disabled.
The goal of reordering is to construct an uninterrupted concrete com-
putation P ′C from a serialized concrete computation P
s
C .
In order to transform the serialized computation P sC into an uninter-
rupted computation P ′C , the initial event in each action execution is held fixed
in the sequence and the remaining events in the execution of every action are







Figure 4.3: The reordering transformation.
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Theorem 3 (Reordering) A sequence of two concrete transitions, each con-
sisting of a single event where the two events are independent, can be reordered
such that if the original sequence starts at state cs and yields state cu, and if
the new sequence starts at state cs, then the new sequence will also yield cu.
(See Figure 4.3.)
Proof
Let e1 be the event making up a transition beginning in cs and yielding ct,
and e2 be an event making up the transition beginning in ct and yielding cu.
If e1 is independent of e2, then the extent of e2 is unchanged by e1 from cs to
ct, and therefore it is possible to create a transition made up of e2 from cs to a
new state ct′. Since e1 is independent of e2, the extent of e1 remains unchanged
from cs to ct′ and therefore it is possible to create a second transition made up
of e1 from ct
′ to a new state cu′. However, the extent of e2 remains unchanged
from ct′ to cu′, and therefore, cu′ is equivalent to cu.
The new sequence from cs to cu replaces the original sequence in the
computation. In order to use the reordering theorem, the events which are
independent must be identified.
Theorem 4 Events in an execution of an action (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) are inde-
pendent of:
1. Prior events in the computation which are part of the execution of actions
in other processes.
2. Message transmission events unless the first event sends the message
which is transmitted.
71
3. Fault events unless the first event sends the message which suffers the
fault.
Proof
Let e1 be one of Events 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 of an execution of an action in process
p.
1. Let e2 be one of Events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 of an execution of an action in
process q, where p 6= q. The extent of e1 includes only variables of p, the
execution pointer of p, and time variables for actions of p, and messages
in the incoming queue of channels originating at p. Likewise, the extent
of e2 includes only variables of q, the execution pointer of q, and time
variables for actions of q, and message in the incoming queue of channels
originating at q, or in the outgoing queue of channels terminating at q.
Since these extents do not overlap, e1 and e2 are independent.
2. Let e2 be a message transmission event (Event 8) for a message m.
• If e1 is not a send event, then its extent does not include a message.
Therefore, e1 and e2 are independent.
• If e1 is a send event for a message m′ and m 6= m′, then since e1 and
e2 do not operate on the same message, e1 and e2 are independent.
As a result, e1 and e2 are independent.
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3. Let e2 be a fault event (Event 7) on a message m. By reasoning similar
to the case above, e1 and e2 are independent.
Theorem 4 enables the construction of a concrete computation that
follows the abstract action atomicity condition from P sC .
Theorem 5 A serialized concrete computation containing a transition made
up of an event from the execution of an action following another transition
made up of an event from the same execution of the action can be reordered
so that the second event immediately follows the first.
Proof
Let e1 and e2 be concrete transitions in P
s
C that are part of a single execution
of an action, where e2 follows e1.
• e1 is one of Events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.
• e2 is one of Events 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.
If e1 and e2 are separated by other events, each of these intervening events
must be one of:
1. Events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in the execution of other processes. However, e2
can be reordered with such an event, because by Theorem 4, the events
are independent.
2. Fault events (7) or message transmission events (8) that do not involve
messages also involved in the transition being reordered. Again, by The-
orem 4, e2 can be reordered with such an event, since even if e2 sends a
message, it cannot be the one transmitted.
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The intervening event cannot be a timer advance event (9), since timer advance
events are assumed to only occur in hub states and there is no hub state
between e1 and e2. Therefore, the computation can be reordered to make e1
and e2 immediately sequential.
In order to achieve the abstract message transmission condition, we
must demonstrate that reordering P sC to follow the abstract message transmis-
sion condition is possible.
Theorem 6 A serialized concrete computation can be reordered so that a tran-
sition with a message transmission event immediately follows the transition
with the event sending the message, as long as send or message transmission
events involving messages in the same channel.
Proof
As described on page 52, any fault events involving a message only occur
after the message is transmitted from the incoming queue of the channel to
the outgoing queue. Likewise, the action choice event removing the message
from the channel occurs after the message is transmitted. Therefore, a message
transmission must be independent of any intervening events between the event
sending the message and the transmission event. By Theorem 3, the transi-
tion with the transmission event can be reordered with any such intervening
transition.
Following Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, it becomes possible to construct
the uninterrupted concrete computation.
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Theorem 7 A serialized concrete computation P sC can be converted into an
uninterrupted concrete computation.
Proof
The uninterrupted computation can be constructed by first noting that the
first transition in the computation is an action choice event, the first event in
the execution of an action, and then following the algorithm:
1. Reorder the computation so that the current action follows the abstract
action atomicity condition. (Theorem 5.)
2. If the current action sends any messages, reorder the computation so
that this action follows the abstract message transmission condition. The
reordering must be done for each message sent by the action in the order
that the messages are sent, to preserve the order of the messages in the
channel. (Theorem 6.)
3. The state following the current action is a hub state. If there are no
further transitions in the computation, the uninterrupted computation
has been completed. If there are further transitions, the next transition
from this hub state is one of the following:
• A timer advance not setting the execution pointer of any process,
or a fault event. In this case, the next state is also a hub state;
continue with step 3 while examining the next transition.
• A timer advance setting the execution pointer of one or more pro-
cesses. In this case, reorder the computation so that each action
execution initiated by the timer advance follows the abstract atom-
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icity and abstract message transmission conditions. Then, continue
with step 3 following the final transition in the last of the actions.
• An action choice event. In this case, continue with step 1.
Because the reorderings described by Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 do not alter
hub states, timer advance events are not involved in these reorderings. As a
result, timer advance events remain unaltered in the new computation and
because the original computation was whole, it therefore satisfies the abstract
timer advance condition.
The algorithm terminates, because it traverses the computation from
beginning to end, and when it does, the reordered computation is uninter-
rupted.
The uninterrupted computation P ′C constructed by the steps above is
equivalent to an abstract computation.
Theorem 8 (Implementation consistency) For any whole concrete com-
putation of a protocol specified in TAP, there exists an equivalent finite abstract
computation of the protocol.
Proof
Let PC be a concrete computation of a protocol P specified in TAP and P
′
C
be an uninterrupted computation produced from PC by the steps above. P
′
C
is equivalent to some finite abstract computation PA because:
• The final state of PC is a hub state, which is preserved in P ′C . This state
is equivalent to the final state of PA.
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• An uninterrupted computation consists of a sequence of:
– Serial events representing the execution of an action followed by a
hub state.
– Fault transitions, followed by a hub state.
– Timer advance events, followed by either a hub state or the exe-
cution of an action. The timer advance events obey the same con-
ditions as the abstract timeout semantics; specifically, that actions
with timeout guards only become enabled when no other guard is
enabled and that all timeout actions with enabled guards are exe-
cuted before any non-timeout action which may become enabled.
As a result, the sequence of actions and faults executed in P ′C are the
same as that in PA.
4.9 Implementation completeness
As described previously, implementation completeness means that, for any
finite abstract computation of a protocol P , there exists an equivalent finite
concrete computation. The concrete computation is constructed using the
abstract computation as a model.
Theorem 9 For any finite abstract computation of a protocol specified in
TAP, there exists an equivalent finite concrete computation of the protocol.
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Proof
Let PA be a finite abstract computation of a protocol P specified in TAP.
Construct PC from PA by doing the following:
1. Begin with a sequence of concrete hub states, where each hub state in
the sequence is equivalent to the corresponding abstract state in PA.
2. Between each pair of hub states corresponding to an action execution
abstract transition, insert a sequence of concrete transitions consisting
of single events corresponding to the execution of the action.
3. Immediately following each send event, insert a message transmission
event for the message.
4. Insert a concrete transition consisting of an error event between each
pair of hub states corresponding to an abstract fault.
5. Immediately prior to the execution of an event choosing a timeout action,
insert a number of steps consisting of timer advance events equal to the
value of the time variable associated with the action.
The resulting PC is equivalent to PA, since
• By the first step, the final state of PC is equivalent to the final state of
PA.
• By the second and fourth steps, the sequence of action executions and
faults in PC is the same as the sequence in PA.
Also, the resulting PC is a valid concrete computation of P , since every pair of
successive states is a concrete transition—the second and fourth steps fill the
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transitions between all of the hub states and the third and fifth steps ensure
that the correct actions are enabled at the next hub state.
4.10 Related work
The proofs in this chapter (and the next) have antecedents, especially in con-
sidering the atomicity of distributed systems.
Sivilotti[65] describes conditions under which sections of code can be
considered atomic, simplifying reasoning about distributed systems:
Any computation in a synchronization system is a refinement of
an atomic computation if that synchronization system has enabled-
stable [the execution of a send in a different process does not disable
an enabled receive] and send-monotonic receives [when swapped
with a prior send, a receive returns the same or a stronger result
if it returns anything], as well as commuting sends [two sends in
different processes can be exchanged in any computation with no
effect].
Further, message passing systems such as those described here in the concrete
model satisfy those conditions if the “message-passing layer [has] arbitrary but
finite delay [that] can be modeled as another process in the computation that
is responsible for shuttling messages from origin to destination.” As will be
seen in the next chapter, the fairness condition of the concrete model ensures
that a message can experience only a finite delay.
Lipton[49] proved a theorem concerning combining atomic operations to
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demonstrate partial correctness and deadlock-freedom properties, using com-
mutivity relations between atomic actions in a manner that appears to be
similar to that of this chapter.
Lamport and Schneider[48] and Lamport[46] also discuss the demon-
stration of safety properties for a program if the properties hold for a coarser-
grained but otherwise similar program. However, the relationship between
Lamport’s work and the two models described here is clearer in the latter.
In that paper, Lamport characterizes the relationship between a distributed
algorithm A (analogous to a protocol executed in the concrete model) and a
reduced version of the same algorithm, Â (analogous to a protocol executed
in the abstract model), in which “an entire operation is a single atomic action
and message transmission is instantaneous.” The conditions Lamport gives
for this reduction to hold are satisfied by the abstract and concrete models,
along with the protocol style assumptions in Chapter 2.
By satisfying the conditions of the previous work, any results due to
those theorems apply to the relationship between the abstract and concrete
models. In fact, the proofs in this chapter and the next could be considered to
be corollaries of the previous theorems, although corollaries limited to the TAP
asynchronous message-passing system. However, the proofs in this chapter and
the next go further by asserting an equivalence between the two models. This
equivalence is not limited to properties relying on atomicity, and relates the




The previous chapter dealt with the equivalence of the two models of execution
based on finite computations. This equivalence indicates that the two models
are strongly related. However, one aspect of the two models that was not
dealt with by the previous chapter is fairness, since fairness does not apply
to finite computations. This chapter describes the relationship between global
and local fairness for infinite computations.
Because in both models fairness is described in terms of action execu-
tions, this chapter will deal with a simplified version of the concrete model
which is identical to the abstract model except for the local fairness condi-
tion. As a result, all states described are abstract states, and the events of
the concrete model are not mentioned. Also, since the abstract model does
not feature delayed message propagation, local fairness is projected into the
abstract model by removing the condition requiring eventual message trans-
mission. Similar arguments can be made in the concrete model by constructing
a projection of global fairness, but the proofs would be more complex.
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5.1 Global fairness
An infinite abstract computation is globally fair if, when an action in any
process becomes enabled in a state asi, then the computation has a subsequent
state asj, j ≥ i, where that action is either disabled or executed.
5.2 Local fairness
An infinite abstract computation is locally fair if, when an action in process
p is enabled in a state asi, then the computation has a subsequent state asj,
j ≥ i, where that action is either disabled or executed.
Global fairness differs from local fairness in that the former is property
of the global computation while the latter is a property of each process in a
computation.
5.3 Proof of fairness equivalence
The proof that global and local fairness are equivalent is presented in two steps:
first, that global fairness implies local fairness for abstract computations, and
second, that local fairness implies global fairness for abstract computations.
Theorem 10 Any globally fair abstract computation is locally fair.
Proof
Let PG be a globally fair abstract computation of protocol P specified in TAP,
p be a process in P , and p.l be an action of p that is enabled in state asi of PG.
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By global fairness, there is a state asj, j ≥ i, where p.l is disabled or executed.
In either case, PG satisfies the conditions for local fairness.
Theorem 11 Any locally fair abstract computation is globally fair.
Proof
Let PL be a locally fair computation of protocol P specified in TAP, p be a
process in P , and p.l be an action of p that is enabled in state asi of PL. By
local fairness, there is a state asj, j ≥ i, where p.l is disabled or executed.
Therefore, PL satisfies the conditions for global fairness.
5.4 Fairness and the Austin Protocol Com-
piler
As described previously, local fairness is a property of each process in a com-
putation. As a result, assuming the statements in each action of the process
are well behaved as described in Chapter 2, it is possible for the compiler and
runtime environment to ensure local fairness for individual processes while
a guarantee of global fairness would be impractical. Specifically, as long as
each action execution terminates, the APC system will ensure that an action
which becomes enabled will not be ignored forever; it will eventually either be
executed or become disabled.
Early versions of the Austin Protocol Compiler did not make this guar-
antee, as they used a different algorithm for choosing actions to attempt to
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execute. The necessity of the guarantee did not become clear until attempting
to create the proofs in this chapter—the original proofs were more complex
and made significant requirements of protocols in order to preserve fairness—
and the implementation of the guarantee required changes in the compiler and
the runtime system. It is interesting to note that the subsequent algorithm for
choosing actions is much simpler than the original; the changes brought on to
improve the fairness qualities also improved the implementation.
A similar situation also occurred regarding the timeout semantics de-
scribed in Chapter 3. The early versions of the APC system allowed multiple
time variables for each timeout action. The proofs in the previous chapter, as
well as the realization that the current approach made many protocols sim-
pler, brought on a change to a single time variable per timeout action, and the
implementation of that change improved the compiler and runtime system.




The Austin Protocol Compiler
The final piece of the protocol development puzzle is the Austin Protocol
Compiler, or APC, which can transform a process described in TAP into ex-
ecutable code in C. In use, the philosophy behind APC is similar to that of
yacc—to provide a simple, flexible interface to complex underlying techniques.
Within this philosophy, a protocol specification is written in TAP, based on
the abstract execution model. APC then translates that specification into an
executable system, based on the concrete execution model.
The most important requirement for APC is to correctly implement the
concrete execution model of the TAP notation. Some parts of this requirement
are necessarily assumptions made about the execution environment and others
are implemented by the systems on which APC is based, but the major com-
ponent of the requirement must be dealt with by the APC implementation.
Additionally, there are two further goals for APC:
• Integration with the C systems programming language. TAP, the lan-





Figure 6.1: The Austin Protocol Compiler
contain many features necessary to a general-purpose programming lan-
guage. Rather than extending this language, APC provides for protocols
to call arbitrary C functions, allowing file input/output, cryptography,
database and buffer management, and other tasks to be handled in the
manner best suited for each of them.
• Simplicity of implementation. Before APC can meet any other goals,
its correct operation must be assured. By keeping the implementation
simple and the compiler’s output understandable, this assurance can be
validated.
APC generates portable C code as shown in Figure 6.1. The file con-
taining the TAP source is filename.ap, the file filename.c contains function
definitions, and the file filename.h contains the data structure definitions and
function prototypes.
The generated code is intended to be readable and uses meaningful
identifiers based on the original TAP source. This choice does have a disad-
vantage in that the identifiers may conflict with those used elsewhere by the
programmer, however it provides the advantage of allowing the generated code
to be compared with the original source.
Error handling in APC is currently somewhat primitive, with some
errors only identified by the C compiler. Fortunately, the readability of the
generated code and the structural similarity of the code to the original source
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make these errors significantly easier to locate.
The APC runtime library is built on top of a base network protocol,
which provides services for sending and receiving messages. The base network
protocol is limited to UDP in the current version. In turn, the APC-generated
code interfaces with other systems for specific functionality within the control
structure of the protocol.
The Austin Protocol Compiler software is available from the Austin
Protocol Compiler home page1 in the APC package.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the architecture of the Austin
Protocol Compiler, the programming interfaces provided by the compiler-
generated code and the runtime library, and the details of the runtime library
itself.
6.1 Architecture of the compiler
The compiler is implemented in approximately 1500 lines of Python plus a
500 line grammar specification using Flex and Bison and a 1000 line C/Python
interface between the parser and the Python code.2 The overall architecture of
the compiler is shown in Figure 6.2. The Python components of the compiler
are written in an object-oriented fashion, with the primary classes being nodes
of the abstract syntax tree. The AST is instantiated by a function, the AST
node generator of Figure 6.2, called from the parser. The generic AST nodes,
called the Generic AST in Figure 6.2, are instances of classes for tokens and
symbols. These instances provide access to the information from the parse
1http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/mcguire/software/apc/













Figure 6.2: Architecture of APC.
tree such as identifier names, numeric values, and sub-trees. The base module
containing the AST generator and the generic AST classes also provides the
interface to call the parser on a file, as well as syntax and other error handling.
A second module provides C code generation. This module consists of
subclasses of the generic AST node classes, shown as the C-specific AST in
Figure 6.2. These subclasses provide methods to the generate C code from
their corresponding elements of the abstract syntax of TAP.
The compiler design is simple, compact, and provides the ability to fur-
ther extend the C code generator or to replace it with other output generators.
The code generated by the compiler is made up of two major pieces:
message handling and TAP processes.
6.1.1 Message handling
In the generated C code, messages are represented by three components:
1. A data structure named after the message, describing the message’s fields
for use in the process’ actions. The data structure contains one record
per field with the type of each record based on the type of the field: a
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bit-sized, integer field results in a long integer record, and a byte-sized,
data field results in a unsigned character pointer record.
2. A function allowing an action to recognize and parse a message when
it is received. The message reader function converts integer fields from
network byte order to host byte order, checks that constant fields have
an appropriate value, and assigns to each character pointer record the
matching location in the incoming message. The reader function returns
true if the message being parsed is recognized, according to its size and
the value of constant fields, and false otherwise.
3. A function enabling an action to store the message an a buffer for trans-
mission. The message writer function converts integer records to network
byte order and copies their value as well as the data pointed to by char-
acter pointer records to a temporary buffer for transmission.
The message definition notation is intended primarily to support the
message formats used by common Internet protocols, specifically the “box” di-
agrams common in RFCs. Neither the message definition notation of TAP nor
the code generated is intended to handle every possible format for messages.
For messages which cannot be handled in TAP, the message definition can be
declared “external” in the TAP source. In this case, the two functions are not
generated and must be provided by the programmer. By hand-generating the




A TAP process is also represented in the C code by three components:
1. A pair of data structures, called the state data structure and the tag
data structure, with the state data structure containing the process’s
state and the tag data structure containing information describing the
process;
2. A pair of initialization functions, the first setting up the state data struc-
ture and the second setting up the tag data structure of the process; and
3. A set of action functions, with one function per action in the process;
Process data structures. The state data structure contains records for
each of the process’s constants and variables. The fields are referenced by
the code of the process’s actions. Fields in the structure are either unsigned
integers, abstract addresses, or arrays of one of those basic types.
The tag data structure has a generic prefix common to all processes,
allowing the protocol runtime system to interact with the process. The tag
data structure contains records holding:
• A text string naming the process,
• A reference to the state data structure for the process,
• Lists of action function records for actions with local and receive guards,
• A list of time variables used by timeout guards in the process, along with
the function implementing the action, and
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• A buffer for messages sent locally between processes executing within
the same runtime system,
Process initialization. Each process uses two initialization functions, one
for each of the two data structures. The first sets the records of the state data
structure with the initial value of the process’s variables and constants.
The second function sets up the tag data structure, including calling
the function to initialize the state data structure, setting up the local message
buffer and the records for the process’s action functions and time variables.
Additionally, this function prepares the information needed to assign values to
abstract addresses which are part of the process’s state. Finally, this function
informs the APC runtime system about the process.
As described previously, there is no way to specify a value for an address
variable or constant from within TAP, and the address variables and constants
are translated into state data structure records containing abstract addresses.
One way that a variable address acquires a value is when used in a receive
guard—the process of recognizing the message sets the variable to the address
of the message’s sender. On the other hand, it is necessary to identify a remote
process in order to begin to communicate with it. Many address variables or
constants need to be initially assigned an address, either for the base network
protocol or for local communication. As part of the process structure initial-
ization, the generated code registers with the runtime system the identifier
used by the process for each of its addresses as a text string. This identifier
is associated with the location of the address constant or variable in the pro-
cess’s state. Since the variables and constants can be arrays, the identifier
is additionally associated with the dimensions of the variable or constant—a
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non-array simply has zero dimensions. This registration is used to identify the
address when it is assigned a value by external code, using functions provided
by the APC runtime system described on page 94.
Action functions. The actions of a process are translated to C functions.
The parameters of the functions depend on the type of the action guard,
although all action functions take the tag data structure of the process con-
taining the action as a parameter. Actions with local and timeout guards
produce functions with no other arguments while actions with receive guards
produce functions that also take a buffer containing the received message, the
message’s size, and the abstract address of the sender.
For local and receive guards, the action functions logically take the form
of a single C if statement. The translated guard of the action makes up the
condition of the statement, with local guards having a translated predicate,
and receive guards calling message parsing functions. The translated state-
ments of the action become the body of the if statement. Timeout guards
do not have any predicate associated with the guard and therefore the func-
tions for such actions do not have the overall conditional structure, but simply
contain the translated statements.
The integer returned value of the action function is used by the runtime
system to distinguish three possibilities:
• A returned value of zero indicates that the guard of the action was false.
In this case, the statements of the action function have not executed and
the state of the process has not changed.
• A returned value greater than zero indicates that the guard of the ac-
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tion was true. In this case, the statements of the action function have
executed and the state of the process may have been changed.
• A returned value less than zero indicates that an unexpected error has
occurred. Such errors will terminate the runtime system.
The generated code is linked with a runtime system to produce the
executable protocol. The information provided by the compiler is used by the
runtime system to implement TAP’s concrete execution model.
6.2 APC runtime interfaces
Like yacc, the Austin Protocol Compiler generates a protocol implementa-
tion that is invoked from an external program and that in turn invokes other
external functions. The interfaces between the external program and the pro-
tocol implementation, and between the protocol implementation and external
functions are described by C functions and data structures. The next section
describes the interface between the external program and the protocol im-
plementation, and the following section describes the interface to code called
from TAP statements. Finally, the last section in this chapter describes the
interface between the runtime system and the functions recognizing incoming
messages and and buffering outgoing messages, as used by messages which are
declared “external.”
6.2.1 Initializing and executing the runtime system
Preparing to execute a TAP process is essentially a four step procedure:
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1. The first step is to initialize the protocol engine, described on page 97,
and the base network protocol. The function used to do this with the
UDP base network protocol is:
UDP initialize engine(int port)
This function accepts a UDP port number on which to listen for incoming
messages.
2. The second step is to initialize each process that will execute within the
protocol engine, using a function generated by the compiler:
process p(char *process tag,
p state t *state,
p process t *process)
The p will be replaced by the name of the TAP process. The process tag
argument provides a text identifier for the local message-passing address
of the process, allowing more than one instance of a TAP process to be
executed within a single protocol engine while allowing another process
to send messages locally to this instance. The state and tag data struc-
tures are generated by the compiler, but must be allocated by the code
calling this function; the handling of these two arguments is described
on 91.
3. Since there is no way to initialize an address variable or constant in TAP,
the code invoking the protocol engine must do it, calling the following
function for each address variable or constant:
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APC set address(APC process t process,
char *identifier,
APC address type t type,
char *address)
The process and the identifier arguments identify the address variable
or constant to be initialized; the identifier is the name of the address
variable or constant in the TAP process definition. If the actual ad-
dress is an element of an array, the identifier argument should also have
an array reference suffix describing the particular element to be initial-
ized: “addr[1]”, for example. The type argument indicates whether the
address is either:
• A base network protocol address, in which case the address argu-
ment should be a string describing the address according to the
convention of the base network protocol interface. For UDP, this
is “hostname:port number”, the remote host name or IP address
followed by the remote UDP port number separated by a colon, or
• A local address, in which case the address argument should match
the process tag of a local process, given in the process initialization
function.
4. The final step is to execute the protocol engine:
APC engine()
This function does not terminate unless the protocol engine reports an
error.
All of these functions may report errors via their returned values.
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6.2.2 Invoking C functions from TAP
Because the protocol implementation generated by APC is embedded in C,
functions invoked by the protocol process’s statements are called as normal C
functions, with the following argument conventions:
• Integer values are passed as C long integers, and
• Data values, such as fields in messages, are passed as unsigned character
pointers.
Values may be passed as arguments to functions or may be returned by func-
tions, as described in the grammar on page 37.
6.2.3 Message functions
As described previously on page 89, messages may be declared to be external,
in which case the programmer must provide implementations of the functions
reading a newly received message and writing an outgoing message to a buffer.
The prototypes of these two functions, with m replaced by the name of the
message, are:
• read m(unsigned char *incoming, int in length, m *dest)
• write m(m *src, unsigned char *outgoing, int out length)
The dest and src arguments are pointers to the data structure describing the
message’s fields; this structure is always generated by the compiler and the type
of the structure is named after the message. The incoming, in length, outgoing,
and out length parameters describe the buffer containing the incoming message
or to which the outgoing message should be written.
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6.3 Architecture of the runtime system
The runtime system is divided into three components:
• The abstract protocol engine and interface made up of approximately
1000 lines of C.
• The base network protocol interface, including sending and receiving
messages and managing address values. For the current version, the base
network protocol is limited to UDP and is made up of approximately
350 lines of C.
• The local message passing interface, interacting with TAP processes in
the same way as the base network protocol although only transferring
messages between processes executing in the same runtime engine. This
interface is made up of approximately 250 lines of C.
The core of the runtime system is the protocol engine, illustrated in
Figure 6.3. During the engine’s execution, it maintains the engine maintains
references to:
• The processes that are running within the engine,
• All of the local and receive action records, with pointers to the functions
implementing the actions and to the process containing each action, and
• All of the time variables associated with each timeout-guarded action in
the processes running in the engine.
The protocol engine supports the execution of multiple local processes by
maintaining the references to the action records without regard to the process
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Runtime library Generated code
Figure 6.3: APC runtime architecture. Each process has pointers
to its state structure and to its own action records. The protocol
engine has pointers to each process and to lists of all of the action
records.
containing the actions or time variables. For example, if multiple processes
are running within a single engine, when a base network protocol message is
received the receive action functions from all processes running in the engine
are allowed to try to parse it. The first action function which recognizes the
message executes the statements from its action, with the state for the process
supplied from the action record. After a message has been recognized and
handled, no further receive action functions are tried with the message.
6.4 Implementation of the concrete execution
model
The protocol engine described previously is designed to ensure the guarantees
of the TAP concrete execution model. The algorithm used by the engine
is shown in Figure 6.4. This algorithm ensures the following conditions of
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1. Attempt to execute each local action function once.
2. If any process has messages waiting in its local buffer, attempt
to execute the process’s receive actions with each waiting mes-
sage.
3. Calculate a new delay value:
(a) If any local or receive action function executed in step 1
or 2, the new delay is zero;
(b) If there are outstanding time variables, the delay is the
time until the next time variable expires;
(c) Otherwise, the delay is unbounded, and the process will
wait until a message arrives from the base network pro-
tocol.
4. Wait for the delay to expire, if there is one, or for a message
to be received from the base network protocol.
5. If a message has been received, attempt to execute each pro-
cess’s receive action functions with the waiting message.
6. If the time variable delay has expired, execute the correspond-
ing timeout action function.
7. Return to step 1.
Figure 6.4: Algorithm of the APC protocol engine.
protocol execution that satisfy the concrete execution model from page 48:
1. The execution of the engine proceeds by invoking the functions imple-
menting the actions of each process serially. Each of the functions exe-
cutes atomically with respect to the other actions of the process contain-
ing it, ensuring that no two actions from the same process are executed
concurrently.
2. The action choice event of the concrete execution model is performed by
the protocol engine in steps 1, 2, 5, and 6, outside of the execution of
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any action function. As a result, no action function can be executing
when another action is chosen for execution.
3. The compiler generates each action function to correctly implement the
statements of the body of the action, ensuring the proper execution of
each action.
4. Because message transmission is decoupled from the execution of each
action function, by the base network protocol and by the local message
interface, no two operations on the same message can be simultaneous.
5. Each action function is assumed to execute quickly, relative to the du-
ration of the timeout delay. As a result, the passage of time can be
assumed to occur in step 4, outside the execution of any action.
The assumptions concerning message delay and errors described on
pages 52 and 52 are based on the behavior of the base network protocol.
The UDP base protocol satisfies these conditions, and while the local message
transmission mechanism does not delay messages and should not suffer from
faults in the same way as the base network protocol, its behavior does not
contradict the assumptions.
The concrete model’s timeout behavior described on page 53 is likewise
based on the behavior of implemented protocol actions—each action function
is assumed to execute quickly, relative to the duration of the timeout delay.
As a result, the passage of time is assumed to occur entirely in step 4, and the
choice of executing an action with a timeout guard can be assumed to occur
in step 6.
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Finally, the overall algorithm of Figure 6.4 enforces the local fairness
conditions described on page 53—no action in a process can be prevented from
executing indefinitely by the execution of other actions, since every action
function is invoked before any one is invoked again.
The algorithm of Figure 6.4 is also the source of the requirement for
protocol quiescence on page 25: if any local action becomes enabled, then it
must be executed or disabled before the process will wait again. The algorithm
makes it impossible for any process to wait when a local action is enabled.
The Austin Protocol Compiler and its runtime system implement the
guarantees made by the concrete execution model, and the concrete execution
model is equivalent to the abstract execution model. As a result, the behavior
of an implemented protocol will be the same as the behavior expected from




In order to validate the Austin Protocol Compiler, we took two protocols
described elsewhere, re-specified them in TAP, and completed the framework
needed to create prototype implementations of them. These two protocols
serve as both a sanity check on the behavior of an implementation produced
by APC and as functional examples of relatively complex protocols built using
APC.
The first protocol is the secret exchange protocol, which is intended to
securely change message integrity keys used between two network routers. This
protocol is the simpler of the two examples in this chapter and demonstrates
the basic functionality of APC. After describing the background of the secret
exchange protocol and presenting its TAP specification as well as the outside
code needed by it, two traces of its execution are presented, the first showing
the protocol executing normally and the second showing the behavior of the
protocol reacting to an attacking adversary.
The second protocol is the accelerated heartbeat protocol, which is used
to monitor the status of the processes involved in the protocol as well as the
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network between the processes. This protocol is more complex since it dynam-
ically adjusts its timeout delays in response to message losses. After describing
its background and presenting its specification and code, three traces are pre-
sented, showing the protocol’s normal behavior, its response to a permanently
failed process, and its response to a temporary series of lost messages.
The specifications and code of both of these protocols are part of the
apc-examples package, available from the Austin Protocol Compiler home
page.1
7.1 The secret exchange protocol
Current TCP/IP networks are vulnerable to a number of security problems.
One class of security problems that is particularly difficult to handle is called
a denial-of-service attack, whose aim is to exhaust the resources of a network
or of a host, so that normal services provided by the network or the host are
reduced or denied. Two examples of denial-of-service attacks are:
• “Smurf” attacks[2], which use the ICMP Echo Request/Reply
messages[58] to attack a network host d. The attacker inserts an Echo
Request into the network with the source address forged to be the ad-
dress of d and with a destination address set to a multicast address for
every host on the network. Every host on the network receiving such a
request sends an Echo Reply message to d, flooding the network and d.2
• SYN attacks[1], which attack the TCP connection protocol of a network
1http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/mcguire/software/apc/
2Hosts should not respond to ICMP messages sent to multicast addresses, but historically
this condition has not always been implemented correctly.
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host d. Normally, a TCP connection is opened by a three-way hand-
shake: a host c sending d a message with the SYN flag set, after which
d replies to c with a message having the SYN and ACK flags set, and
c completing the handshake with a message having an ACK flag set;
following the handshake, both hosts know that the connection has been
successfully created. When d receives the SYN message, it must reserve
resources for the new connection, and these resources are the target of
the attack; if many SYN messages are received in a short time, d will
run out of resources and be unable to open new connections until those
half-connections time out. In order to make the attack harder to defend
against, the attacker forges the source addresses of the SYN messages,
setting each to the address of a different host.
Denial-of-service attacks are difficult to defend against because there needs
to be no relationship between the attacker and the contents of the forged
messages constituting the attack. Other attacks, however, are possible using
similar techniques. In general, an attacker can insert forged messages, modify
existing messages, and replay old messages as part of an attack.
7.1.1 Hop integrity
In order to defend against these kinds of attacks, we introduced protocols to
provide hop integrity [28] for a network. A network provides hop integrity iff:
1. Whenever a router p receives a message m supposedly from an adjacent
router q, then p can determine whether m was modified by an attacker
after it was sent by q and before it was received by p.
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2. Whenever p receives m supposedly from q, then p can determine whether
m is a copy of an earlier message received by p.
Hop integrity can be provided by two protocols for transferring data
messages between two routers: the weak integrity protocol and the strong
integrity protocol. The weak integrity protocol adds to each message a message
digest computed of the text of the message and a secret key shared between
the two routers, satisfying the first requirement of hop integrity. The strong
integrity protocol also adds sequence numbers (using “soft” state) to prevent
message replay and satisfy the second requirement of hop integrity.
An attacker attempting to modify a message between q and p will be
detected by the weak integrity protocol. An attacker attempting to replay a
message between q and p will be detected by the strong integrity protocol.
Finally, an attack made up of forged messages will also be detected, since
• If a forged message appears to have traveled through q, it will not contain
the correct message digest, and
• If forged messages appear to have come from a host on the subnetwork
between q and p, traditional ingress filtering[26] will detect the forgery.
7.1.2 Implementation of the secret exchange protocol
Both the weak integrity protocol and the strong integrity protocol make use
of a secret key shared between the two routers executing the processes of the
protocols. By design, the secret key should be changed often. Generating
and exchanging the secret key is the function of the secret exchange protocol.
One process of the secret exchange protocol, pe, is executed by the router p
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process pe
const Rp : integer = 0;
Bq : integer = 0;
te : integer = 20000;
tr : integer = 1000;
qe : address
var sp : integer = 0;
sq : array [2] of integer = 0;
d, e : integer;
initialize : boolean = true
· · ·
Figure 7.1: The secret exchange protocol, part 1.
and is shown in Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3. The other process,
qe, is executed by q and is defined symmetrically. Figure 7.4 defines the two
messages used by the secret exchange protocol.
The messages used by the protocol are a key change request and a key
change reply:
• The rqst message contains a one byte field for the message type and an
8 byte data field containing two 32 bit keys. The first key in the field
is the current key used for sending messages to p, and the second is the
newly generated key.
• The rply message contains a one byte type field and a single 32 bit data
field acknowledging the new key.
Process pe uses the following constants and variables:
• The constant Rp is the long-term private key of pe and the constant Bq




initialize → act sendrqst in 0; initialize := false
[] timeout sendrqst → sq[1] := NEWSCR();
rqst.e := NCR(Bq, 2, sq[0], sq[1]);
send rqst to qe;
log(“sent rqst (%d, %d)”, sq[0], sq[1]);
act resend in tr;
act sendrqst in te
[] rcv rqst from qe → d, e := DCR(Bq, 0, rqst.e), DCR(Bq, 1, rqst.e);
log(“received rqst (%d, %d)”, d, e);
if (sp = d) ∨ (sp = e) → sp := e;
reply.e := NCR(Bq, 1, sp);
send reply to qe;
log(“sent reply (%d)”, sp);
[] (sp 6= d) ∧ (sp 6= e) → log(“detect adversary: bad rqst”)
fi
· · ·
Figure 7.2: The secret exchange protocol, part 2.
inputs to the protocol, and should be set by the network administrator.
In the prototype described here, the values are arbitrary.
• The constant te is the interval between secret key changes. This interval
should be relatively short, on the order of a few minutes. The constant
tr is the timeout for retransmitting key change requests. This timeout
should be an upper bound on the round-trip delay between the two
routers, on the order of a few seconds.
• The constant qe is the address of the process qe.




[] rcv reply from qe → d := DCR(Rp, 0, reply.e);
log(“received reply (%d)”, d);
if sq[1] = d → sq[0] := sq[1]
[] sq[1] 6= d → log(“detect adversary: bad rply”)
fi
[] timeout resend → if sq[0] 6= sq[1] → rqst.e := NCR(Bq, 2, sq[0], sq[1]);
send rqst to qe;
log(“resent rqst (%d, %d)”, sq[0], sq[1]);
act resend in tr
[] sq[0] = sq[1] → skip
fi
end
Figure 7.3: The secret exchange protocol, part 3.
message rqst
begin
type : 8 bits = 1,




type : 8 bits = 2,
e : 4 bytes
end
Figure 7.4: Messages from the secret exchange protocol.
• The variable sq is an array containing the old and new secret keys used
when receiving messages from qe.
• The variables d and e are two temporary values.
• The variable initialize is a flag used to enable the action initializing the
process. This action, the first in process pe, is executed once when the
process begins and sets in motion the first key change.
Finally, pe uses the following C functions for encryption, decryption,
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and generating keys. Since the implementation discussed here is a prototype,
simple encryption algorithms are used. These algorithms are not strong enough
for production use.
• NEWSCR generates and returns a new secret key. NEWSCR uses the
rand() C library function; a production implementation should use a
more secure random number generator.
unsigned long NEWSCR(void)
• NCR accepts at least two arguments, and encrypts the subsequent count
unsigned long arguments with key, returning the resulting buffer. NCR
uses simple XOR encryption; a production implementation should use a
much stronger algorithm.
char *NCR(unsigned long key, unsigned long count, ...)
• DCR decrypts the unsigned long value at offset of buffer using key. Like
NCR, DCR uses XOR encryption.
unsigned long DCR(unsigned long key,
unsigned long offset,
char *buffer)
• Finally, log announces important messages; the current version prints the
message to the process’ standard output. Other options include logging
the message remotely, using syslog, for example.
void log(char *message)
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These C functions are implemented in two separate modules each made
up of a source file and a header file. The TAP file containing the definition
of pe has include directives which bring the header files into the generated C
code for the process.
For pe to change its secret sq, four steps need to be performed. Each
of these four steps is represented by an action in pe and qe:
1. First, pe generates a new key, sq[1], and encrypts the concatenation of
the old key, sq[0], and the new key using qe’s long-term public key, Bq.
The resulting request message is sent to qe. This step is handled by the
sendrqst timeout action in Figure 7.2.
2. Second, when qe receives the request message, it decrypts the contents
using its long-term private key, Rq, and obtains the old key and new
key. Then qe checks that its current sq equals the old key from the
request message, installs the new key as its current key, and sends a
reply message containing the encryption of the new key using pe’s long-
term public key Bp. This step is handled by the action guarded by “rcv
rqst” in Figure 7.2.
3. Third, pe waits until it receives a reply message from qe containing the
new key encrypted using Bp. This indicates that qe has accepted the
new key. This step is handled by the action guarded by “rcv rply” in
Figure 7.3.
4. If pe sends the request to qe but does not receive a reply for tr millisec-
onds, the request message or the reply message has been lost. In this
case, pe resends the request message to qe. This step is handled by the
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pe state t state;
pe process t process;
log(”start”);
UDP initialize engine(atoi(argv[1]));
process pe(“pe”, &state, &process);





Figure 7.5: C statements executing process pe. The program in
this example accepts two command line arguments. The first,
argv[1], is the numeric UDP port number on which process pe
should listen for messages. The second, argv[2], is the address of
process qe, including the hostname and port number.
resend timeout in Figure 7.3.
At all times, the secret key used for the integrity protocol message digest
for messages sent from p to q is sp. The secret key used for messages sent from
q to p is either sq[0] or sq[1]; sq[0] is normally used, but if the keys are in the
process of being changed, sq[1] may be necessary. The two integrity protocols
try the two keys in that order.
The definition for pe along with the definition of the rqst and rply
messages and the include directives for the C functions described previously
make up the source code of the protocol itself. Given the TAP source, the
Austin Protocol Compiler generates a C module, made up of a source file
and a header file, containing the translated code and data structures for the
protocol. This module is then combined with a program skeleton to create the
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executable implementation.
Figure 7.1.2 presents the program skeleton, the code used to set up
and execute pe from the C main() function. The first argument to the pro-
gram, argv[1], is the UDP port number on which pe should listen for incoming
messages and the second argument, argv[2], has the hostname and UDP port
number of qe.
Since the reliability of the secret exchange protocol is paramount, it
has been verified[28], and the code generated by the compiler was compared
with the specification. As seen in Chapter 6, the Austin Protocol Compiler
maintains the guarantees necessary for the correctness of the protocol. As
a result, the execution of the protocol matches the expected behavior of the
specification, avoiding the intrinsic problems of network protocol development.
7.1.3 Behavior of the secret exchange protocol
apcc pe.ap
gcc -IAPC-runtime-directory -I../commona -g -O2 pe-main.c
gcc -IAPC-runtime-directory -I../common -g -O2 sep.cb
gcc -IAPC-runtime-directory -I../common -g -O2 pe.c
gcc -g -O2 -o key-exchange pe-main.o sep.o pe.o \
-LAPC-runtime-directory -lAPCc ../common/libcommon.a
aThe common library contains the log function.
bThe sep module contains the encryption functions.
cThe APC library contains the runtime engine.
Figure 7.6: Compiling the key exchange process.
The C code for the process described in Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3
and the messages in Figure 7.4 was generated and linked with a main() function





0.000327 send rqst (0, 57606676)
1.001112 resend rqst (0, 57606676)a
1.259442 start
1.259777 recv rqst (0, 1899027511)b
1.259803 send reply (1899027511)
1.259838 send rqst (0, 1899027511)
1.259872 recv reply (1899027511)
2.001939 resend rqst (0, 57606676)
2.002043 recv rqst (0, 57606676)
2.002067 send reply (57606676)
2.002122 recv reply (57606676)
20.001195 send rqst (57606676, 1126385251)c
20.001308 recv rqst (57606676, 1126385251)
20.001334 send reply (1126385251)
20.001377 recv reply (1126385251)
21.260038 recv rqst (1899027511, 2004821925)
21.260101 send reply (2004821925)
21.260136 send rqst (1899027511, 2004821925)
21.260173 recv reply (2004821925)
aProcess qe sent its first request before pe was started.
bThis request matches the trace entry by pe at 1.259838 seconds; it
appears a context switch occurred between sending the message and call-
ing the log function. Misordered entries such as this appear several times
in this example.
cThis entry begins the first periodic key change.
Figure 7.7: Normal execution trace of the key exchange protocol.
previously as well as the APC runtime library. The sequence of commands
performing these steps is shown in Figure 7.6. The result was an executable
file called key-exchange, which was used to create the execution traces in
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8. In both traces, key-exchange was executed twice,
as processes pe and qe. Both processes executed on the same machine, to
ensure that the trace timestamps remained correct.








11.055430 send rqst attack (787824220, 2092571940)a
11.055562 recv rqst (1384642625, 13163321)b
11.055588 detect adversary: bad rqstc
· · ·
21.055868 send rply attack (1194734761)
21.056046 recv reply (1040998259)
21.056072 detect adversary: bad rplyd
aThis rqst contains the current key used by the integrity protocol be-
tween q and p, as a worst-case scenario, and new, randomly generated
key known by the attacker. It is not encrypted with the long-term keys
known to pe and qe.
bSince the wrong long-term key was used to encrypt the rqst, the
decrypted current key does not match what pe expects.
cThe attacker has been detected.
dAs above, since the wrong key was used to encrypt the forged rply, it
does not match what pe expects and the attacker is detected.
Figure 7.8: Execution trace of the key exchange protocol under attack.
behavior of the secret exchange protocol. Each line in the trace represents a
single line of output produced by the log function, with a timestamp of the
event at the left. Each request includes the old and new secrets, and each
reply identifies the new secrets being acknowledged.
Notice that requests to change secrets are generated approximately
20 seconds after the last secret change, and that message retransmissions are
sent after approximately 1 second. Both of these delays are specified in Fig-
ure 7.1, by the constant values of 20000 for te and 1000 for tr. The two
constants are used in activation statements in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.8 shows a partial execution trace of pe under attack. The
process labelled “attacker” simulates an attacking host located between q and
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p. This attacking host does not know the long-term keys used between q and
p and is attempting to forge secret change requests and replies. In the two
attacks shown, the forgery was detected because the decrypted secrets did not
match what process pe was expecting.
While the correctness of the secret exchange protocol has been verified
and the implementation described here appears to function correctly, further
work is necessary. For example, experimentation with the implementation is
needed for the following extrinsic aspects of the secret exchange protocol:
• The proper values for the timeout delays, te and tr, of the protocol.
• The appropriate sizes for the encryption keys used by the protocol
and the appropriate encryption algorithms to use for NCR, DCR, and
NEWSCR.
These parameters depend on the security of the encryption algorithms as well
as their performance, particularly the message digest algorithm used by the
integrity protocols. The prototype of the secret exchange protocol created
with the Austin Protocol Compiler is a first step for these experiments.
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7.2 The accelerated heartbeat protocol
A fundamental construct for tolerating faults in computer networks is a heart-
beat protocol. A heartbeat protocol allows processes in a network to peri-
odically exchange beat messages. As long as a process p keeps receiving beat
messages from a process q, p recognizes that q and the communication medium
from q to p are both up. If p does not receive any beat messages from q for a
long time, p recognizes that q has terminated or failed or that the communica-
tion medium from q to p has failed. In this case, p itself terminates. Therefore,
a heartbeat protocol ensures that if one or more processes in a program fail or
terminate, then every other process in the program terminates.
There are three contradictory objectives for a heartbeat protocol:
1. In order to reduce the overhead of the protocol, as few beat messages as
possible should be sent.
2. In order to increase protocol responsiveness, the detection delay (which
is the longest period that can pass after one process terminates and
before the heartbeat protocol causes all processes to terminate) should
be small.
3. In order to improve reliability, the probability of premature termination
(which is the probability that the heartbeat protocol causes all processes
to terminate due to the loss of beat messages and not due to the termi-
nation of a process or the permanent failure of the network) should be
small.
It is possible to make a compromise between the objectives and con-
struct a heartbeat protocol which is configurable for different requirements
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and network conditions. This protocol is called the accelerated heartbeat
protocol[29]. It minimizes the protocol overhead while providing an acceptable
tradeoff between detection delay and the probability of premature termination.
Consider the case where the network that has only two processes, p[0]
and p[1]. The communication between p[0] and p[1] can be partitioned into
successive time periods. In each period, p[0] sends a beat message to p[1] then
waits to receive back a beat message from p[1]. The length of each period
depends on the events that occurred in the preceding period according to the
following three rules:
1. If in a period, p[0] sends a beat message to p[1] and receives a beat
message from p[1], then p[0] makes the length of the next period a large
value tmax (irrespective of the length of the current period). The value
of tmax is determined by the acceptable detection delay and by the
probability of premature termination.
2. If in a period, p[0] sends a beat message to p[1] but does not receive a
beat message from p[1], then p[0] makes the length of the next period
half that of the current period.
3. If the length of the next period ever becomes less than tmin, an upper
bound on the round trip delay for beat messages between p[0] and p[1],
then p[0] terminates and stops sending beat messages to p[1].
Rule 1 is adopted to ensure that when p[0] and p[1] and the commu-
nication medium between them are all up (a typical situation), the rate of
sending beat messages is kept small. Rules 2 and 3 are adopted so that when
p[0] suspects a failure or termination, p[0] tries to refute this suspicion several
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times in a short span before it finally accepts its suspicion and terminates.
Thus, these two rules ensure that both the detection delay and the probability
of premature termination are kept small.
From these three rules, if p[0] does not receive any beat message for
a period of 2tmax, then p[0] terminates. Moreover, if p[1] does not receive
any beat message for a period of 3tmax − tmin (and so it does not send any
beat messages for the same period), then p[1] recognizes that p[0] has already
terminated and p[1] itself terminates.
To understand the period 3tmax− tmin, consider the following scenario:
1. p[0] sends and receives beat messages. The period is tmax .
2. The network fails; all further messages are lost.
3. After a period of tmax , p[0] sends a beat message.
4. After another period of tmax , p[0] has received no beat message. It sends
a beat message and makes the next period tmax/2.
5. p[0] continues to halve the period until it terminates.
The time between steps 1 and 3 is tmax , between steps 3 and 4 is tmax , and
between steps 4 and 5 is bounded by tmax− tmin. Thus, the period between
steps 1 and 5 is bounded by 3tmax− tmin.
The two-process heartbeat protocol can be extended to a protocol that
involves n + 1 processes, p[0] to p[n]. In this extended version of the accel-
erated heartbeat protocol, p[0] executes a acts as p[0] above, except that it
communicates with every other process. The communication between p[0] and
the processes p[i], 1 ≤ i ≤ n, can be partitioned into periods. In each pe-
riod, process p[0] sends a beat message to every p[i] process and then waits
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to receive a beat message from every p[i] process. When p[0] receives a beat
message from any p[i], p[0] records this fact.
At the end of each period, process p[0] computes the length of the next
period as follows: First, p[0] computes the length of the next period for each
process p[i] as described previously. Second, p[0] selects the smallest delay to
be the length of the next period.
The analysis of how values for the acceptable detection delay, the prob-
ability that a beat message will be lost by a single error, and the upper bound
on the round trip delay combine to set the values of tmax and the probability
of premature termination is described elsewhere[29] for both the two process
and n process accelerated heartbeat protocol. The remainder of this section
discusses the implementation of a three-process accelerated heartbeat protocol.




type : 8 bits = 1,
id : 8 bits
end
Figure 7.9: Message definition for the accelerated heartbeat protocol.
The beat message exchanged by the processes of the accelerated heart-
beat protocol is defined in Figure 7.9. In this message, the type field indicates




const tmin : integer = 1000;
tmax : integer = 10000;
pn : array [2] of address
var rcvd : array [2] of boolean = true;
tm : array [2] of integer;
t : integer = 10000;
k : 0..2;
p : address;
initialize : boolean = true
begin
initialize → k := 0;
do k < 2 → tm[k], beat.id := tmax, k;
send beat to pn[k]; k := k + 1
od;
act tick in t;
initialize := false
· · ·
Figure 7.10: The accelerated heartbeat protocol, process p[0], part 1.
The first process definition in the protocol, p0, is the “root” process.
The definition of p0 is shown in Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11. The second
process definition, pn, is executed twice, as the child processes p[1] and p[2].
The definition of pn is shown in Figure 7.12.
The definition of p0 in Figure 7.10 uses the following constants and
variables:
• The constant tmin is an upper bound on the round trip delay between
the process in the protocol, to be used as a lower bound on the timeout
delay for the heartbeat period. For this prototype implementation, this
constant is set to 1 second.
• The constant tmax is the normal period for sending beat messages. The
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· · ·
[] timeout tick → log(“tick);
k := 0;
do k < 2 → if rcvd[k] → tm[k] := tmax
[] ¬rcvd[k] → tm[k] := tm[k] / 2
fi; k := k + 1
od;
if tm[0] <= tm[1] → t := tm[0]
[] tm[0] > tm[1] → t := tm[1]
fi;
if t < tmin → log(“exit”);
exit(2)
[] t ≥ tmin → k := 0;
do k < 2 → beat.id, rcvd[k] := k, false;
send beat to pn[k]; k := k + 1
od
fi;
act tick in t
[] rcv beat from p → log(“rcv beat(%d)”, beat.id);
rcvd[beat.id] := true
end
Figure 7.11: The accelerated heartbeat protocol, process p[0], part 2.
detection delay for failures is 3tmax. For this implementation, it is set
to 10 seconds.
• The constant pn is an array containing the addresses of the child pro-
cesses. Since this array is constant, the values of these addresses must be
set by the program using APC set address before executing the protocol
engine.
• The variable rcvd is an array of boolean values indicating whether a beat




const tmin : integer = 1000;
tmax : integer = 10000;
p0 : address
var initialize : boolean = true
begin
initialize → act inactive in 3*tmax - tmin;
initialize := false
[] rcv beat from p0 → log(“rcv beat(%d)”, beat.id);
send beat to p0;
act inactive in 3*tmax - tmin
[] timeout inactive → log(“exit”);
exit (2)
end
Figure 7.12: The accelerated heartbeat protocol, process p[1] and p[2].
• The variable tm is an array containing the heartbeat period for the
protocol between p[0] and the corresponding child process.
• The variable t is The minimum value from tm, to be used as the delay
for the next round. Initially, t is set to tmax.
• The variables k and p are two temporary variables; k is used as an index
into the various arrays and p is used when receiving messages from a
child process.
• The variable initialize guards the first action of the process; it is initially
true but set to false after the first action is executed.
The first action of p0 in Figure 7.10, sends an initial beat message to the
children and sets up the delay for the first round. Each beat message contains
an id field which identifies the child process to which the message is sent.
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The second action of p0 in Figure 7.11 computes the delay for the next
round according to the rules from page 117 and whether or not a beat message
has been received in the current round from each child. This action potentially
either:
• Terminates the program, if t < tmin, or
• Sends a new round of beat messages and activates the timeout for the
next round, if t ≥ tmin.
The third action of p0 in Figure 7.11 simply receives a beat message
from a child and marks the element of the rcvd array based on the id field in
the message.
The definition of pn in Figure 7.12 uses only a single initialize variable,
to enable the initial action which sets the initial delay after which pn will
execute the third action. The second action of pn receives the beat message
from p0, returns it, and resets the delay for the third action. The third action,
enabled only when pn has not received a beat message in the 3tmax − tmin
time period, terminates the process.
7.2.2 Behavior of the accelerated heartbeat protocol
The TAP processes described in Figure 7.10, Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12 and
the message in Figure 7.9 were compiled and linked with driver programs, the
APC runtime library, and the logging function. The processes of the protocol
were executed on the same machine, in order to generate an accurate trace of
the activities of the processes. The behavior of the protocol when executed
normally is demonstrated in the trace in Figure 7.13. In this trace, beat
messages are exchanged every tmax milliseconds.
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Figure 7.13: Normal execution trace of 3-process accelerated heartbeat proto-
col.
More complex behavior from the accelerated heartbeat protocol is
shown in Figure 7.14. In this trace, p[1] was terminated after a few seconds
of execution and then restarted, allowing the heartbeat protocol to recover.
Process p[1] was down for approximately 13 seconds, missing two rounds.
Finally, Figure 7.15 shows the behavior of the accelerated heartbeat
protocol when p[1] permanently fails after a few seconds of execution. As
designed, p[0] terminates within 3tmax milliseconds or 30 seconds, and p[2]
terminates within a further 3tmax milliseconds after the final beat message is
sent.
One use of the accelerated heartbeat protocol is in monitoring existing
protocols which do not have flexible heartbeat mechanisms, as described in
Gouda and McGuire[30]. The system described in that paper uses a hand-
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coded version of the accelerated heartbeat to monitor traffic over a TCP con-
nection with a minimal impact on the protocol using the TCP connection. An
earlier TAP specification of the accelerated heartbeat was integral in develop-
ing the hand-coded implementation.
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bp[0] discovers that p[1] is not responding and reduces next period to
5 seconds.
cp[1] is restarted, but after the beat message is lost.
dp[0] discovers that p[1] did not respond to the last round and reduces
the next period to 2.5 seconds.
ep[1] responds to the first beat message after restarting.
fp[0] discovers that p[1] is responding and sets next period to 10 sec-
onds.
gThe heartbeat has returned to normal.


































bp[0] discovers that p[1] is not responding and reduces the next period.
cp[0] terminated.
dp[2] terminated.





The Domain Name System[52, 53, 4], or DNS, is a distributed database map-
ping hierarchical keys, or names, to extensible, generalized values, or resources.
The key features of the DNS are:
• The database is distributed among a large number of independently ad-
ministered servers. This is a reliability and scaling feature as well as
an administrative feature: the resources are replicated through several
servers as well as being partitioned between groups of servers, avoiding
any single point of failure for the DNS as a whole. Also, the admin-
istrative domain responsible for a given part of the data typically has
authority over the servers for that part of the data.
• The key space is organized heirarchically, in a tree structure proceeding
from an otherwise nameless root to top-level domains such as “edu,”
“com,” and the two-letter ISO country code domains, and thence to
second and lower-level domains such as “utexas” and “cs.utexas.” This
hierarchy roughly corresponds to the organizational and thus adminis-
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trative structure of the data. Each name is made up of a sequence of
labels and uniquely identifies a node in the hierarchy by beginning at the
root and choosing a child node identified by the next label in the name.
• The values in the database are described by an extensible set of resource
records, with each kind of resource record containing information useful
for a different application. Each record is identified by a
class, such as IN, the Internet class; and a type such as A, which provides
an IPv4 address for the name of the node, or MX, which identifies the
name and preference value for an Internet e-mail server for the name.
DNS is primarily described in RFC1034[52] and RFC1035[53] although
extensions (particularly for security and internationalization) and new resource
records are described in a large number of further RFCs. For this chapter,
however, RFC1034 and RFC1035 are the only primary sources. In particular,
DNSSEC[25] is not covered.
According to RFC1034, the DNS consists of three components:
1. The tree-structured domain name space and the resource records for
data associated with the names. The name space is administratively
organized into zones, each consisting of a subtree of the name space.
The root of each zone subtree is a node associated with a SOA (Start
Of Authority) resource record and each zone contains the descendent
nodes down to, but not including, any lower-level nodes with another
SOA record. Since the descendent zones may be contained in a different
DNS server, the parent zone needs to have enough information, called
glue, for a client to contact the server for the child zone.
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2. The name servers. A name server is a program holding information
about the domain name space. Name servers perform two different, but
related, roles:
• An authoritative name server contains complete information about
one or more zones, including all of the names in each zone, all of
the records for those names, and the glue needed by sub-zones. Au-
thoritative servers are divided into master servers and slave servers.
A master server contains, by definition, up to date authoritative in-
formation about a zone. A slave server, on the other hand, contains
authoritative information which may be out of date; slave servers
get their information about zones by means of a zone transfer from
the master server for the zone.
• A caching name server contains incomplete information about any
number of zones. For performance reasons, not every request for
DNS information should result in a request to an authoritative
server; since multiple requests are frequently made for the same
information, requests from DNS clients may be satisfied from a lo-
cal, caching server. To support caching, every record in a response
from a DNS server contains a time-to-live, or TTL, field describing
how long the record may be cached.
Some DNS server programs, such as the Berkeley Internet Name Domain,
or BIND, are capable of performing both roles at the same time, but such
usage is deprecated. Most other DNS server packages separate the two
roles into two different programs and even BIND recommends that the
two roles be separated into two hosts.
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3. Resolvers. A resolver is a program which extracts information from
the DNS for a client. A resolver is typically a library function such as
gethostbyname called by a client program.
The DNS network protocol is very simple, normally consisting of a
request and response. One complication is CNAME records, which provide
aliases for domain names and which the server must follow in generating the
response. Another complication is that a DNS query has four possible re-
sponses:
• An authoritative response that the given name does not exist.
• An authoritative response that, although the name exists, no record of
the requested type for the given name exists.
• The resource record or records that were requested.
• A pointer to a sub-zone, indicating that, while the server is not capable
of answering the query, a server for the indicated sub-zone may be able
to.
The final possibility results in two possible further behaviors for the server:
• A server noting that it cannot answer a query may itself forward the
query to a server for the sub-zone. This behavior is called a recursive
query, and is the normal behavior for a caching server—it only responds
to a client with the final answer, which is one of the first three possibil-
ities.
• A server that cannot answer a query may respond with an indication
that it cannot do so. This response will include the glue information
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needed by the requester to further track down the answer. This is the
normal behavior of a non-caching, authoritative server.
The DNS network protocol for TCP/IP networks is capable of using
two transport protocols, TCP or UDP. Typically, TCP is used only for large
messages that will not fit into a single UDP datagram. These large messages
are usually zone transfers; almost all other DNS requests and responses use
UDP.
While performance is not a key requirement for the DNS system, it is
a very important attribute for a DNS server, since the DNS is an important
part of the Internet infrastructure, the databases needed for some zones are
very large, and many servers must respond to a large volume of requests.[22,
37, 50, 40]
The remainder of this chapter presents an implementation of an author-
itative DNS server process, called aserv, based around a protocol specification
given in TAP. The specifications and code for this implementation is available
as part of the apdns package from the Austin Protocol Compiler home page.1
8.1 The authoritative DNS server
The TAP definition of a DNS query message is shown in Figure 8.1. The format
of a response message is the same, except the type field is set to 1. These
messages consist of two parts: a header and a body. In the TAP definition, all
but the last field make up the header part. Header fields are used as follows:





id : 16 bits,
type : 1 bit = 0,
opcode : 4 bits,
aa : 1 bit,
tc : 1 bit,
rd : 1 bit,
ra : 1 bit,
z : 3 bits,
rcode : 4 bits,
qdcount : 16 bits,
ancount : 16 bits,
nscount : 16 bits,
arcount : 16 bits,
body : size - 12 bytes
end
Figure 8.1: A DNS query message. The DNS response message,
named “resp” in the TAP definition, is the same except that the
type field is a constant 1.
• The opcode field indicates the type of the query, normally a standard
query. Other options include an inverse query and a server status request,
neither of which are addressed here.
• The aa field is used in a response message, indicating that the server
responding is authoritative for the name in the query.
• The tc field is used in a response messages to indicate that the response
is too large to fit in the message and has been truncated.
• The rd field is set in the query message when the requester wants the
server to pursue the query recursively; a normal client might set this
while a caching server making a query might not.
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• The ra field is used in a response message to indicate whether or not
the server is willing to recursively pursue queries; an authoritative server
may not be.
• The z field is reserved for future use and should be set to 0.
• The rcode field is used in a response message to indicate the results of
the query as follows:
0 No error condition.
1 The name server was unable to interpret the query.
2 The name server was unable to process this query due to a problem
with the name server.
3 The domain name referenced in the query does not exist.
4 The name server does not support the requested kind of query.
5 The name server refuses to perform the specified operation for pol-
icy reasons.
The remaining fields refer to sections in the message body and are discussed
later.
The body part of a DNS message, either a query or a response, is made
up of four sections:
• A query section containing the request being made. The query consists
of a name, a type and a class. The number of entries in the query section
is given by the qdcount field in the header; it is normally one. For query
messages, the remaining sections of the body are empty. For response
134
messages, the query section is copied over and the remaining sections
contain the response information.
• An answer section containing the resource records answering the query.
The ancount field of the header gives the number of records in the answer
section.
• An authority section containing NS (name server) resource records.
Some servers add these records to describe the authority for any an-
swer, which aids caching for future requests. However, the contents of
this section are only needed when the server is not capable of answering
the query and is not willing to pursue it recursively. The NS records are
part of the glue telling the requester where to go next. The nscount field
gives the number of records in this section.
• An additional information section. When the responding server cannot
answer the query and is returning glue information, it normally puts
address records into the additional information section. These address
records match the NS records in the authority section, and are also part
of the glue information telling the requester where to go next. The
arcount field gives the number of records in this section.
Common parts of the body sections of a DNS message are names. Since
DNS messages may contain many names or many copies of the same name (as
part of multiple resource records, for example), the names use a compression
scheme. Each name is made up of one or more labels, and in a message each
label is represented by a length byte followed by the corresponding number of
bytes making up the label. However, since each label is limited to 64 bytes,
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the two high bits of the length must be zero. The compression scheme uses
these two bits differently: if instead the two high bits are one, the remaining
six bits of the length byte plus the next byte are taken as an offset in the
message. The label found at that offset, plus any following labels, are used as
the remainder of the current name.
Because the sizes and formats of the four body sections are variable,
they cannot be described in TAP. Instead, the body of the message must be
parsed by external C code during the processing of the message, as seen in
Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3 present the authoritative DNS server process,
aserv. This process has a single action, which receives a DNS query message.
Upon receiving the query, the action begins building a response by copying
fields from the query and setting the recursion available flag to zero and the
authoritative answer flag to one. Then it calls the C function parse query.
The parse query function checks the query for unsupported options such as a
zone transfer request or multiple query records in the query section, converts
the query to an internal form, and begins to prepare a response message by
storing the query record in the query section of the response buffer. Finally,
parse query returns a flag indicating whether the query message is valid or
not.
If the query is invalid, the response’s rcode field is set appropriately and
the remainder of the response is copied from the query message.
If the query is valid, the action in aserv calls the C function query da-
tabase, attempts to locate one or more records satisfying the query. Figure 8.4
presents the algorithm used by the query database function. The return value
of the query database function determines the contents of the response mes-
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process aserv
var c : address;
fnd, invld : integer
begin
rcv query from c →
resp.id := query.id; resp.opcode := query.opcode;
resp.rd := query.rd; resp.ra := 0;
resp.aa := 1;
resp.qdcount := query.qdcount;
invld := parse query(query.qdcount, query.body);







[] ¬invld → ... /* See Figure 8.3. */
resp.tc := response oversize();
resp.body := response body();
resp.size := response size() + 12
fi;
send resp to c
end
Figure 8.2: The authoritative DNS server process, part 1.
sage:
• If query response returns 0, records matching the query have been found
and must be copied into the response buffer, as well as setting the re-
maining fields of the header such as ancount.
• If query response returns 1, records representing glue information must
be copied into the response buffer. In this case, however, the response is
not authoritative.
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fnd := query database();
resp.rcode := response code(); /* either NXDOMAIN or NOERROR */
if fnd = 0 → resp.ancount := response ancount(); /* name and record found */
resp.nscount := response nscount();
resp.arcount := response arcount()
[] fnd = 1 → resp.aa := 0; /* response points to subdomain */
resp.ancount := response ancount();
resp.nscount := response nscount();
resp.arcount := response arcount()
[] fnd = 2 → resp.ancount := 0; /* rcode = NXDOMAIN: no name */
resp.nscount := 0;
resp.arcount := 0




Figure 8.3: The authoritative DNS server process, part 2.
• If query response returns 2 or 3, no further records need to be copied
since the rcode field contains the distinguishing information.
The buffer containing the stored records for the response is returned by the
response body function.
Behind the parse query and query database functions lie almost all of
the complexity of the DNS server. This complexity comes from the difficulty
in parsing the query body, supporting the database, and generating the re-
sponse body. When managing this complexity, a key advantage of the Austin
Protocol Compiler design becomes vital: Since the compiler generates C code,
any tools available to C programs are also available when implementing pro-
tocols. In this case, the DNS server implementation uses the Flex and Bison
parser generator tools and the Boehm-Demers-Weiser conservative garbage
collector[12, 13]. Flex and Bison are used to parse the DNS database informa-
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1. Locate resources records matching the name from the query.
2. If matching records are found,
(a) Select records matching the type and class of the query.
(b) If such records are found, save them to be stored in the
response. In this case, query database returns 0.
(c) If no such records are found, nothing will be stored in the
response and query database returns 1.
In either case, the rcode field of the response will indicate
success.
3. If no records matching the name from the query are found,
(a) Attempt to locate nameserver records for a sub-zone con-
taining the name from the query.
(b) If no suitable NS records are found, nothing will be stored
in the response and query database returns 2. The rcode
field of the response will be set to NXDOMAIN, indicating
no name exists.
(c) If an NS record is found, store it and the related glue
information for use in the response. In this case,
query database returns 3. The rcode field of the response
will indicate success.
Figure 8.4: Algorithm for query database.
tion, from the RFC1035-formatted master files. The garbage collector provides
memory management for the database and for DNS message handling.
The current implementation described here has a number of limitations.
In addition to not dealing with extensions to the basic DNS protocol, it also
uses a very simplistic database which limits the contents of the database to
a single zone, along with the glue needed for sub-zones. The database is
also inefficient for large domains. Also, no guarantees are made about the
correctness of the implementation—the specification is complex and not always
139
clear and this implementation has undergone only minimal interoperability
testing.
8.2 Implementation performance
As mentioned previously, the performance of a DNS server is important. In
order to analyze the performance of protocols implemented with the Austin
Protocol Compiler, we compared the implementation of the DNS server de-
scribed in this chapter with two other commonly used server implementations.
The Berkeley Internet Name Domain[39], or BIND, software is de facto
standard DNS software implementation. It includes a name resolver library
and tools for querying and administering the DNS as well as a DNS server. The
BIND DNS server, named, is capable of acting as both an authoritative server
and a caching server although the Internet Systems Consortium, the produc-
ers of BIND, recommend administratively separating the two functions. The
named server also implements essentially every option for the DNS protocols,
including supporting TCP connections, zone transfers, and the DNSSEC secu-
rity extensions. Finally, the database of DNS information stored by the named
server is kept in the server’s memory.
D. J. Bernstein produces djbdns[9], another DNS software implemen-
tation. In contrast to BIND, djbdns divides server functionality between a
number of programs, including an authoritative name server, tinydns, and
a caching name server, dnscache. An additional program, axfrdns, supports
TCP connections for zone transfers; tinydns, for example, only supports UDP
queries. The primary requirements for the djbdns software are correctness and
security; one result is that the database of DNS information is stored in the
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server’s filesystem.
The server described in this chapter, aserv, shares some features with
both named and tinydns. Like named, it reads zone information from an
RFC1035-formatted master file and keeps the database in memory; djbdns
supplies another program which parses zone information from a configuration
file in a non-RFC1035 format and writes it to a binary database file used by
tinydns. On the other hand, aserv is designed to behave more like tinydns in
not handling zone transfers or a caching service.
We used BIND version 9.2.3, apdns version 0.9, and djbdns version 1.05
in these measurements. The client programs for each test are part of the
apdns package and use the Poslib[71] DNS library version 1.0.2. The default
optimization and code generation configurations were used for all packages.2
The server host is an AMD Athlon XP 2200+ running at 1800MHz
with 512MB of memory, using Linux kernel version 2.6.0. The client host for
the remote measurements is a 1333MHz Intel Celeron with 256MB of memory,
using Linux kernel version 2.4.18. Both machines were in single user mode dur-
ing the measurements, with only required system processes running. The two
machines are connected via a 100Mb/s ethernet, with a measured throughput
(via nttcp[6]) of 7.2MB/s.
Since the quality of the database is not relevant to the protocol imple-
2It is interesting to note that these measurements provide an extreme example of the
compatibility problems of network protocol development. The comparison is between three
unrelated implementations of the authoritative server process of the DNS protocol, made
using an implementation of the client process that is itself unrelated to any of the servers.
One of the servers, named, implements essentially every enhancement and extension made
since the original development of the DNS protocol; another, tinydns, only implements a
chosen, production-quality subset of them; and the third, aserv, does not implement any
and is not complete with regard to the features of the original DNS specification. Yet in
the end, all must work compatibly to make the measurements.
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example.com. IN 86400 SOA a.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. (
2 ; Serial
10800 ; Refresh: 3 hours
3600 ; Retry: 1 hour
86400 ; Expire: 1 day
3600 ; Negative caching TTL: 1 hour)
example.com. IN 86400 NS a.example.com.
a.example.com. IN 86400 A 172.16.0.1
1.0.16.172.in-addr.arpa. IN 86400 PTR a.example.com.
b.example.com. IN 86400 A 172.16.0.2
2.0.16.172.in-addr.arpa. IN 86400 PTR b.example.com.
below.example.com. IN 1024 NS c.below.example.com.
c.below.example.com. IN 1024 A 172.16.0.3
Figure 8.5: Master file used by the BIND and apdns servers.
mentation, a small database containing only a few records was created for each
server. The master file used by BIND’s named and apdns’s aserv is shown in
Figure 8.5; an equivalent configuration was created for djbdns’s tinydns.
There are three components to a network protocol implementation’s
temporal performance:
1. Latency, or the time a single request or transfer takes,
2. Throughput, or the number of requests (or the amount of data trans-
ferred) that the implementation can handle in a unit time period, and
3. Overhead, or the processing time per request that the implementation
takes outside of that to directly satisfy the request.
These three components are clearly related; latency and throughput are ap-
proximately inverses. The overhead, however, alters that basic relationship.
For example, it is possible to optimize for reduced latency by moving compu-
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tations that are needed by the protocol but unnecessary to a current request
outside of a “critical path” for the request. The result is an implementation
with improved latency but unchanged throughput (or perhaps worse through-
put, if shifting the overhead computation has costs). In any case, the three
components are separately important, since a protocol implementation should
be capable of responding to a request quickly, be capable of responding to a





Miss rate aserv named tinydns
0% mean 354 398 399
std. dev. 74.4 47.9 45.4
25% mean 341 407 391
std. dev. 75.6 53.8 46.0
50% mean 341 402 394
std. dev. 72.7 45.2 64.2
Local
Miss rate aserv named tinydns
0% mean 98 187 109
std. dev. 73.9 14.7 8.3
25% mean 97 192 111
std. dev. 69.9 12.6 9.2
50% mean 92 188 108
std. dev. 64.9 14.7 11.6
Figure 8.6: DNS server request latency. A lower value is better.
The latency and throughput measurements were taken in two configu-
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rations:
• A remote configuration with the DNS client processes executing on a
client host and the server executing on a server host and
• A local configuration with the client and the server both executing on
the server host.
The first configuration gives a view of the performance in a network setting
while the second removes the costs of network communication, which have a
tendency to conceal the differences between the systems.
The latency of DNS queries is measured by recording the start time,
making a query, waiting for a response, and reporting the length of the in-
terval between the start time and the completion time. The program which
performed this measurement reads 100,000 queries from a file sequentially.
Three input files were generated for the measurements:
1. A list containing only queries in the database; all of the queries matched
records in the server’s database.
2. A list with a 25% miss rate: 25% of the queries are not in the database,
with an even mix of missing domain names and missing records.
3. A list with a 50% miss rate.
Figure 8.2.1 shows the results of the latency measurements, including
the mean latency for the 100,000 queries and the standard deviation of the
latencies. Two features are clear: the aserv server has less consistency in its
latency, leading to the larger standard deviations, and the aserv has a lower
latency, although not significantly lower than tinydns.
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The differences in latency are not necessarily meaningful; the aserv
server has less functionality than tinydns and much less than named, so the
comparison is not wholly valid. However, the performance of the Austin Pro-


























Figure 8.7: DNS server request throughput. A higher value is
better.
The basic throughput measurements use a program which make 100,000
queries and reports the length of the interval between starting the queries and
completing them. Since there was only a minimal difference between the three
different database miss rates in the latency measurement, only the 0% miss
rate file was used for the throughput and overhead measurements.
Since each query requires a certain amount of turn-around time, while
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the client is parsing the previous response and preparing the next query, the
basic throughput measurement does not adequately show the server through-
put. To close in on the potential throughput, several client processes were
executed simultaneously, making requests from the same server. The poten-
tial throughput is conceptually the asymptote of the curve described by the
throughput of the server as the number of client processes increases.
Figure 8.2.2 shows these curves, for both configurations of each of the
three servers. The remote configurations cluster at the bottom of the graph—
this shows the effects of the network communication costs in concealing the
difference between the servers. In both configurations, however, the BIND
named server has the lowest throughput; presumably because it is the largest,
most complex of the programs. The tinydns server and the aserv server are
again fairly close together, with a perhaps meaningless advantage to aserv.
8.2.3 Overhead
CPU time (sec)
User time System time Total
named 3.44 3.22 6.66
tinydns 1.52 3.43 4.95
aserv 1.19 2.09 3.28
Figure 8.8: DNS server CPU overhead. A lower value is better.
The final measurement is the overhead of the server, taken while the
server responds to 100,000 queries from the latency client in the remote con-
figuration. The measurements were taken using the program time, a tool to
summarize system resources usage. The two portions of the CPU overhead
146
are user time, showing the CPU time spent by the process itself, and system
time, showing CPU time spent by the operating system kernel on behalf of
the process—performing I/O, for example.
Again in this figure, aserv shows the lowest total cost as well as the
lowest independent system and user times. Again, this is presumably because
named is a large, complex program, while tinydns takes the approach of open-
ing, accessing, and closing its database file on each query—hence the larger
system time for it.
8.3 Performance of the Austin Protocol Com-
piler
The measurements in this chapter are not meant to attempt to show that
apdns’s aserv is in any way better than either named or tinydns. The aserv
implementation is deficient in many ways. However, the measurements do
demonstrate that the performance of an Austin Protocol Compiler-based sys-
tem is entirely reasonable.
Performance, measured as either throughput, latency, or overhead, has
not been a major driver for the design of the Austin Protocol Compiler. So far,
though, the performance of the simple implementation has been entirely ade-
quate. If performance does become a limiting factor, the design of the Austin
Protocol Compiler has some openings for possible performance improvement.
• In the current system, message recognition is integrated with message
parsing. The recognition/parsing process is attempted for each receive
action without favoring any action. However, it should be clear from the
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discussion of the message handling functions on page 89 that message
recognition in the Austin Protocol Compiler is easily translatable to a
packet filter approach[74]. With a packet filter system built into the pro-
tocol engine, the runtime system could directly dispatch the appropriate
receive action.
• In a similar situation, the current system does not favor any action when
attempting to execute the local actions. An approach to limiting the
search for enabled local actions would be to have the compiler identify
two sets of variables for each action:
1. The set of variables used in the guard of the action. This set will
be empty for receive and timeout actions, but will be non-empty
for reasonable local actions. This set is called the guard set.
2. The set of variables possibly modified by statements of the action.
This set is called the watched set.
Using the guard and modified sets, it is possible to deduce the chaining
behavior of the process’s actions by finding the set of local actions which
may have been enabled by the execution of another the of actions.
Beginning in a state where all of the local actions are disabled, the only
possible step in the process is the receipt of a message or the expiration
of a timeout delay. Following one of those events, the runtime system
can maintain a set of possibly enabled local actions, called trial actions,
built from the watched set of the action handling the event and the guard
sets of the local actions. The trial actions would then be attempted in
turn. When a local action is attempted and found to be enabled, the
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other local actions which may be chained from it are also added to the
trial actions. (An executed action must also be re-added to the set, since
it may not have disabled itself.) Actions are removed from the trial set
when they are attempted and found to be disabled. Although there are
degenerate cases, when implementing a reasonable protocol this scheme
should result in fewer attempted actions. For example, it correctly covers
the cases of the two examples from Chapter 7, where the initial action
is executed once and need never be examined again.
Both of these enhancements would introduce considerable complexity
into the Austin Protocol Compiler. So far, neither seems worthwhile, since
they address scaling issues in the protocol specification (the first for larger






In Chapter 1, we identified three classes of problems that, in combination,
uniquely apply to network protocol development:
1. Intrinsic problems, made up of the problems of safety and liveness, errors
and security associated with any distributed or parallel program.
2. Extrinsic problems, made up of the problems presented by the environ-
ment of the network protocol, and
3. Compatibility problems, made up of the difficulties of protocol interop-
erability, protocol extensions, and future protocol enhancements.
In the intervening chapters, we presented the Timed Abstract Protocol
notation, a small, formal language intended for describing asynchronous, mes-
sage passing network protocols. We also presented two execution models for
TAP: an abstract execution model suited for protocol design, comprehension,
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and verification, and a concrete execution model suited for easy implemen-
tation. We then argued that the two models are equivalent: that a protocol
under the concrete model preserves the intended behavior of the protocol given
under the abstract model.
The equivalence between the abstract execution model and the concrete
execution model yields two further points:
• The practice of using high-level abstractions to specify and verify network
protocols is entirely valid, as long as the abstractions can be preserved
by lower-level constructs.
• The practice of using low-level constructs to implement network pro-
tocols is also valid, as long as these constructs preserve the abstract
behavior of the protocl.
We also described the Austin Protocol Compiler, a system that trans-
forms a TAP specification of a protocol process into executable C code and
that provides an runtime environment for that code. We finally showed several
examples of protocols implemented using APC.
The final question is how the Timed Abstract Protocol notation and
Austin Protocol Compiler satisfy the three classes of problems from the first
chapter.
• TAP, under the abstract model, is a powerful tool for describing, com-
prehension, and verifying network protocols. As such, it is well suited
for handling the intrinsic problems, since such problems exist within the
protocol itself and are capable of being formally described.
• APC, in combination with TAP, is a powerful tool for implementing
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network protocols. By allowing a protocol to be written, modified, and
made executable quickly and easily, TAP and APC allow extrinsic prob-
lems to be identified experimentally and allow various approaches for
handling them to be explored.
• TAP combined with APC is a powerful tool for specifying network pro-
tocols. By allowing the protocol to be understood in isolation from the
application around it and by easily providing a reference implementa-
tion, the combination eases interoperability problems. Also, since the
combination exposes the protocol as a separate entity, it better shows
openings for protocol extensions and enhancements.
9.2 Future research directions
The development of the Timed Abstract Protocol notation and the Austin
Protocol Compiler, as described here, is fundamentally complete. However, a
number of interesting questions remain open and a number of research avenues
are unexplored.
9.2.1 Enhancements
The Timed Abstract Protocol notation, along with the abstract and concrete
execution models, is quite effective at describing asynchronous, message pass-
ing network protocols. The limitations placed on the execution models, in
particular, support the development of most network protocols by limiting the
potential effects of faults to the most common problems.
However, a worthwhile direction for research is to investigate changes to
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the language and to the abstract and concrete execution models to remove the
limitations described on page 55. There are many network protocols which
must tolerate some, if not all, of the extended errors. Also, security is an
increasing concern, and the handling of vulnerabilities is a vital consideration
of future protocols.
Some of these limitations do not appear to introduce significant difficul-
ties for the execution models. For example, unrecognized message faults and
the message-oriented security vulnerabilities do not introduce complications
into the execution models. Others, such as process termination and simple
process crashes do not appear to be greatly problematic on the surface. How-
ever, process crashes during the execution of an action, Byzantine failures,
process state modification and process replacement do appear to have signifi-
cant effects on the execution models. Finally, timing errors offer the potential
of significant disruptions to both the execution models and to the relationship
between them, if only because the timeout semantics are the most complex
portions of the models and the relationship.
What is needed is a precise definition of the effects of each additional
feature, in both execution models, and an investigation of the changes to the
models and the equivalence relationship needed to accommodate the feature.
9.2.2 Alternative compiler back ends
The Austin Protocol Compiler implementation currently produces portable C.
While it would be fairly trivial to create other modules to produce code in
different programming languages, more interesting alternatives involve gener-
ating code or specifications for special purposes:
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• A model checker such as SPIN[34, 35], MurΦ[23], or TLC[47]. While
TAP provides strong assumptions in order to ease verification and finite-
state model checking has serious limits, model checkers have proved
useful[19]. An alternative back end that produces input for a model
checker would easily provide mechanical validation of some protocols.
Such a back end would also require changes to TAP, which currently
has no way of specifying the properties that the model checker should
validate.
• A network simulator such as ns[72]. Some properties of network proto-
cols, such as congestion behavior and interaction with other protocols,
are not easily amenable to verification. Frequently, these network pro-
tocols are also difficult or expensive to implement. In these instances, a
network simulator provides feedback to the protocol designer and con-
crete information to potential protocol implementors.
9.2.3 Alternative runtime systems
Currently, the only available basis network protocol is UDP. However, the im-
plementation separates the runtime library into the generic runtime engine and
support functions, and the basis network protocol interface. Providing addi-
tional basis network protocols, such as IP or any other asynchronous message-
passing protocol, would be a simple extension. The only major requirement is
that the protocol be supported by the BSD socket interface and this require-
ment could be removed with some work.
It would also be possible, although not necessarily as simple, to use
a non-message-passing protocol, such as the stream-oriented TCP, as a base
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protocol. While we have not investigated the necessary changes, it is clear
that the message recognition approach would need to be modified since TCP
does not preserve message boundaries.
A third exciting possibility would be the use of APC in entirely different
environments, such as resource-constrained embedded systems like networked
sensors[33]. The constraints on these systems, both in terms of computation
and in terms of the network architecture created when the sensors are deployed
put most common network protocols out of reach. Yet the same constraints re-
quire more out from the network protocol used among the sensors and between
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